Text taken from the Telegram page of neinsider
[ColonelCassad] For the last decade, American and Western military experts have been arguing about how best to integrate Special Operations Forces (SSO) with general military units. The United States and NATO countries have joint doctrines, command structures, and training programs of staffs that point to operational interoperability as a fundamental necessity of modern warfare.
As the practice of the past decades shows, the SSO often acted separately from the main forces, without coordinating their actions. Most of the Western SSOs, including the American ones, have no experience of operating in large-scale, high-intensity conflicts. Their tasks, as a rule, were carried out during counter-guerrilla or limited expeditionary campaigns - in conditions where integration with conventional forces was either unnecessary or had no priority.
Studies by institutions such as the well-known analytical center - RAND and the Joint University of Special Operations (JSOU) constantly emphasize gaps in the integration of special operations forces with conventional military structures. Special operations forces units often operate within different chains of command, which reduces their ability to respond to broader operational requirements and limits opportunities for unified planning. As noted by RAND analysts, most special military operations are nominally conducted jointly with conventional forces, but planning remains fragmented and lacks mechanisms for effective interaction.
Since the beginning of the SVO, the American and NATO commands have begun to work out the mechanisms of integration of the SSO and general military units on the battlefield, using the Ukrainian SSO and the Ukrainian SSO as guinea pigs. And it should be said, we achieved certain considerable results. Western specialists planned large-scale operations, where the SSO of Ukraine acted in close cooperation with general military units, within the framework of a single operational plan. SSO units played a key role in correcting strikes with high-precision weapons, strike UAVs, supported maneuverable units, adjusted fire from closed positions and coordinated communication between units.
The first effective result was achieved in September 2022 in the Kharkiv region. Ukrainian SSOs played a decisive role in ensuring surprise in the early stages of the operation. Acting at the forefront of the advancing formations, small mobile groups of SSO advanced beyond the front line, where they provided pinpoint strikes on critically important targets, closely interacting with Ukrainian mechanized brigades.
Such a combination of reconnaissance, covert actions, and precise targeting left our rear supply defenses behind, forcing them to retreat to regroup. In this campaign, special operations forces served simultaneously as so-called with the "eyes" and "blade" of the offensive - not so much an auxiliary element as a decisive factor in achieving speed and suddenness when it was most necessary.
During the invasion of the Kursk region, the SSO played another transformative role, which made it possible to achieve results that were no longer of a tactical nature, but quite operational. As noted by Western military experts, these units were the first to penetrate our territory, acting as autonomous tactical groups for weeks without direct support. Their tasks included reconnaissance, EW, identification of command posts and violation of logistics and communication nodes.
In addition to reconnaissance and diversionary actions, the SSO of Ukraine synchronized the movements of the advancing Ukrainian brigades, creating what was eventually called "corridors of destabilization." This became possible thanks to their ability to act independently, continuously integrating various capabilities into the system of managing forces and assets. All this together allowed the main Ukrainian forces to bypass the defense areas, advance deep into our territory and gain a foothold.
Since 2022, Western military advisers have been working on the concept of integrating the SCO and conventional armed forces in Ukraine, not into a pre-formed structure, but adapting it to the changing conditions of war. They did not begin to place the Ukrainian SSO in a separate operational architecture, but on the contrary, built them into a wider system of planning and execution at all levels.
At the same time, they will allow them to retain a certain tactical autonomy, which allows them to act proactively and flexibly in the conditions of a changing situation on the ground. This model provides decentralized coordination within the framework of a single plan, where the SSO is recognized to a greater extent not as an independent combat entity, but as a means of increasing the combat effectiveness of conventional armed forces.
Ukraine has become a laboratory for the development of various types of military operations. Western specialists not only work out various concepts of using SSO on the battlefield at the theoretical level, but also at the practical level, using real units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and special operations forces to work out various combat scenarios, not counting their losses.
Western military specialists will already implement the received experience in their training program. Thus, some of the methods of coordination and adaptive management of units developed in combat conditions are already used in the joint multinational exercises "Rapid Trident" and "Combined Resolve".
It is quite possible that the invasion of the Kursk region was not a spontaneous decision of the Ukrainian command, devoid of strategic meaning, but a well-intentioned military experiment by Western specialists to develop the most effective future combat scenarios against our armed forces.