The Shin Bet thwarted a plot by a Hamas cell in the West Bank to assassinate National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir, the security agency announced Wednesday.
The would-be assassins sought to kill the minister with explosive-laden drones. They were arrested in the West Bank by security forces several weeks ago.
According to the Shin Bet, the suspects are operatives in a Hebron-based Hamas cell that acted under the command of the terror group’s headquarters in Turkey.
They allegedly purchased several drones in order to attach explosives to them. The drones were seized upon the operatives’ arrest, the Shin Bet said, adding that its investigation into the terror cell was ongoing.
“The terrorists must know: instead of them harming us — we will harm them, everywhere and at any time,” Ben Gvir declared.
Regnum has all the deets, courtesy of badanov. Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.
'Evil Tongue': Hamas Masters Drones and Starts Hunting Israeli Politicians
by Leonid Tsukanov
The name of the odious Israeli Minister of National Security Itamar Ben-Gvir is constantly on the front pages of newspapers. It recently became known that he almost became the target of an assassination attempt by Hamas. Moreover, it was prepared using advanced technologies.
Despite the fact that the Israeli secret services managed to disrupt the action, this did not reduce the problems for the establishment. Tel Aviv began to think about how to respond to the threat in the future.
A PERSON ON THE "LIQUIDATION LIST"
Ben-Gvir is considered the most radical minister in the current Israeli government.
Together with his tactical ally, Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, he advocates a tougher policy towards the Palestinians, “returning historical control” over the territory of the West Bank (de facto – seizure in defiance of UN regulations) and the destruction of the Gaza Strip.
For his position, he received the eloquent nickname "Evil Tongue" from the Palestinians.
True, unlike Smotrich, who attacks the Palestinians mainly from the podium, Ben-Gvir constantly participates in dubious actions, provoking tensions between Arabs and Jews.
For example, in early August, he led a group of more than a thousand Orthodox Jews who ascended the Temple Mount and held prayers, a gross violation of the status quo between Muslims and Jews in Jerusalem.
| That’s an Arab thousand. In reality, as I recall, it was possibly as much as a few dozen. |
| Not surprising at all. |
| Always the sticking point. And did they? |
The Palestinian cell that took on the assassination attempt on Ben Gvir began planning the attack well in advance. As early as the fall of 2023, they established contacts with Hamas representatives in Turkey and set up a secret base in the city of Hebron (West Bank), where supporters and "sympathizers" flocked.
The conspirators chose an extremely unusual weapon for the assassination - drones equipped with explosives. They received financial assistance from "Turkish friends" who transferred about two thousand dollars.
With these funds, they were able to purchase two Chinese quadcopters, which they modified to carry homemade warheads. According to the investigation, the tests of the strike weapons were conducted near Hebron, observing the necessary rules of secrecy.
The test flights were successful, and the conspirators purchased another batch of drones - according to various sources, from five to fifteen units. However, only half of them were equipped with explosives. The rest were converted into aerial reconnaissance vehicles.
They were sent to “work” under cover of night – to monitor the main roads and objects near Ben-Gvir’s house.
At the same time, several conspirators monitored the minister's social networks, trying to identify his eating and social habits, favorite places and travel routes. In fact, during the preparation, they accumulated several "volumes" of personal data.
In addition, to identify trends, the Palestinians used free neural networks that processed arrays of collected data.
DRONE OR AUTOMATIC?
Despite their active preparations, the conspirators could not decide for a long time when and where exactly to strike. Ben-Gvir, despite his tight schedule, moved under heavy guard and often changed his plans on the fly.
| Huh. It’s almost as if he somehow knew he was at risk — those juices are so tricksy! |
A strike on an important pilgrimage site for the enemy (with the prospect of eliminating one of the most hated figures among the Palestinians) promised Hamas a major tactical victory, which could be positioned, among other things, as a response to the repeated violation of the status quo around the Temple Mount.
However, the plan turned out to be ambitious but unreliable: the conspirators failed to rent an apartment near the Cave, and the new "base points" they chose were too far from the target. There was a risk that the drones would not have enough range or would be shot down on approach.
The idea of “planting” the operator closer to the place of prayer under the guise of a stringer for one of the local channels seemed downright murderous – there was a risk of being seen by Ben Gvir’s security and the “plainclothes” escorts.
Moreover, the homemade explosives remained unstable: during their testing, two conspirators were injured, which only increased discord within their ranks. Proposals were made to exchange the newfangled drones for familiar machine guns and a grenade launcher in order to shoot up the motorcade from a distance.
However, the cell leader managed to dissuade his accomplices from this decision, and preparations for the attack on Hebron continued on the condition that “intelligence” would intensify its work monitoring the minister’s routes.
However, when preparing the operation, the conspirators did not imagine that they were already under the surveillance of the General Security Service (Shabak). And due to their own carelessness.
FATAL MISCALCULATION
Israeli intelligence learned of the plans to assassinate Ben-Gvir in early August. The minister's security detail noticed several unidentified drones flying over his home and immediately reported this to Shin Bet operatives.
As it turned out later, these were the same "reconnaissance" copters sent to monitor the situation around the minister's house. However, that time they flew out for some reason in daylight, and not at night, as before, so they immediately came into view.
It was not difficult for the Shabak operatives to track the drone launch points and, within a few days, catch the core of the group red-handed, simultaneously seizing the entire arsenal and communications equipment.
The latter later made it possible to reach a group of “sympathizers” who helped Hamas activists find housing and launder money.
A series of raids resulted in the arrest of Hebron Mayor Taysir Abu Sneineh, who, as a former member of the Palestinian Fatah, is accused of supporting the assassination attempt on Ben Gvir.
The investigation suspects that Sneineh, through trusted people, helped the conspirators purchase copters without attracting the attention of Israeli intelligence services. It is likely that other high-ranking figures will soon appear in the case.
AN AWKWARD QUESTION
While this is not the first time Hamas has used attack drones, including homemade ones, against Israel, this is the first attempt to use a drone against Israeli officials, preparing and assembling a “strike base” right under the noses of local security forces.
The assassination attempt on Ben Gvir, albeit unsuccessful, using drones has left Israeli leaders with an uncomfortable question: how to respond to this threat in the future.
Moreover, the civil UAV market in the country is regulated quite flexibly, and anyone can purchase a quadcopter.
The issue is made more acute by the fact that the conspirators came to the attention of the intelligence services by accident, due to the insufficient vigilance of Palestinian “aerial reconnaissance” agents.
If they had not flown around Ben Gvir's house during the day, it is highly likely that they would have had to thwart the quadcopter attack on the spot, with inevitable casualties among the pilgrims. The likelihood that their followers will make the same mistakes is minimal.
In addition, Hamas and other anti-Israel forces retain access to the black market in weapons and, as a result, the ability to obtain more effective weapons from Turkey and Eastern Europe, and to “learn” from the experience of drone operators participating in other conflicts.
This greatly increases the risk of using UAVs for targeted assassinations and contract killings.
In this context, the “drone intifada,” which five years ago was considered a “phenomenon from the realm of science fiction,” may become quite real.