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| Supreme Court Considering Ending Racially Drawn Electoral Districts |
| 2025-08-08 |
| [American Liberty] The Supreme Court has asked a question long deferred: may race be the predominant factor in drawing congressional districts? On August 1, 2025, in the case of Robinson v. Ardoin, the justices issued an order for supplemental briefing on precisely that issue. At the heart of the case is a map in Louisiana, which connects disparate Black communities across the state to create a second majority-Black district. The method is undisguised: race was the reason for the shape. The rationale? Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act requires it. But does it? And if so, is Section 2 itself unconstitutional in its current interpretation? This moment offers an opportunity to resolve a contradiction at the core of American election law. States like Texas, currently advancing a new map that adds five Republican-leaning districts, now face legal crossfire: if race is not considered, they risk violating Section 2. If it is considered, they risk violating the Equal Protection Clause. One branch of federal law demands race-consciousness, another forbids it. The state is expected to perform a legal contortion that no theory of jurisprudence can justify and no mapmaker can survive. Let us be clear: race-based redistricting, as presently practiced, is not a civil rights triumph. It is a vestige of a failed doctrine, preserved by inertia and political convenience. Its intellectual foundation is cracked. Its moral justification is confused. And its legal coherence has long since collapsed. The Court has spent three decades attempting to split the atom of race and districting. In Shaw v. Reno (1993), it held that districts shaped predominantly by race are presumptively unconstitutional. But it also held, implicitly, that racial consideration is sometimes required. In Miller v. Johnson (1995), the Court offered a test: race must not "subordinate traditional race-neutral districting principles." But this is not a rule. It is a riddle. What is a "traditional principle"? Compactness? Contiguity? Political advantage? And what counts as subordination? The problem is not that these questions are difficult. The problem is that they are incoherent. |
| Posted by:Besoeker |