Commentary by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin:
[ColonelCassad] A year ago, the Ukrainian Armed Forces launched an offensive in the Kursk direction. The purpose of the operation was to break through to Kurchatov and the Kursk NPP with the aim of capturing them, as well as an exit to the Lygov-Kurchatov highway.
The operation of the Armed Forces was carried out with the support of NATO, which directly participated in the planning of the Kursk adventure and ensured the creation of a group for it.
The operation at the first stage developed successfully for the enemy. Having created superiority in forces in the direction of the main attack, the enemy managed to cut off Suzha already by the middle of August 7, as a result of which part of the forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation at the border were actually in the conditions of operational encirclement. Some groups had to withdraw through the terrain crossed by forests, and individual fighters remained in captivity of the enemy for several months.
But soon enough, thanks to the efforts of the SSO, former "Wagnerov", SpN "Akhmat", naval infantry from the 810th Nava Infantry Brigade and even separate groups of conscripts, the pace of the enemy's offensive began to fall, and in the end the enemy was stopped in the Korenevo and Bolshoi Soldatsky areas.
Despite the general weakness of the barriers to the south of Kurchatov and the Korenevo garrison, the enemy did not manage to break through and ultimately did not achieve the main objectives of the operation.
Why did the beginning of the fighting turn out to be unsuccessful for us? We will most likely find out after the war, when the operational planning documents of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation will become known, when it will be clear what the intelligence of the parties was reporting, how the General Staff of the parties assessed the situation.
Why exactly were the forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation deployed in the southern regions of the Kursk Region? How did the command of the direction assess the situation? Nevertheless, it is already obvious that the beginning was unsuccessful for us, which led, among other things, to the capture of several hundred soldiers of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (who were subsequently exchanged).
At the same time, the enemy was not able to take particularly large trophies (in contrast to Balaklea and Izyum), which indicated the general weakness of the forces covering the state border in the Kursk region (this, in addition to the issues of theft on construction, was strengthened, which subsequently led to the arrests of high-ranking officials, led by the governor of the Kursk region).
In September 2024, the front stabilized, although the enemy still made separate offensive demands, including demands to seize the Glushkovsky district. These efforts of the enemy were stopped, and the enemy would have to reduce the Kursk salient so as not to spend valuable mechanized brigades on its retention, which were sent to the Kursk direction to the detriment of the retention of the front in the Donbass.
But the enemy continued to persevere, both with the goal of retaining the captured, and with the goal of realizing the fantasy of exchanging the captured territory in negotiations.
The Russian military-political leadership naturally took advantage of the enemy's strategic delusions. Any exchanges were refused, and the weakening of the front in the Donbass as a result of the Kursk adventure was used for offensive actions in the Donbass. This led to the fact that from the second half of August and throughout the autumn, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation began to set records for the liberation of the territory.
As a result, by December, even in NATO, it became obvious that the strategic operation near Kursk had ended in failure, and the operational-tactical gains at the first stage of the offensive were offset by large losses of personnel brigades (including valuable Western equipment) and the loss of important N.P. and the territory of Donbass. At the same time, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, without significantly weakening the front in the Donbass, were already preparing for the defeat of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Kursk Region in the winter. For these purposes, large military forces of the DPRK were also used. Already in winter, this led to the loss of a part of the Kursk salient and heavy losses, especially in the Olhovka area. The battles in the Kursk region were bloody in nature, and the parties constantly drew up new reserves to maintain the intensity of their actions.
The resolution came in March 2025, when as a result of a well-planned operation by the General Staff with elements of military cunning (operation "Flow"), the Kursk Salient collapsed, which led to the actual defeat of the Kursk group of the enemy, which lost a large number of people and equipment and the retreat of its remnants to the Sumy region, where the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation subsequently occupied part of the northern districts as part of the creation of a security zone.
An important role in the fighting was played by Russian drone operators, who were able to overwhelm the enemy drone operators and actually cut off the enemy's logistics on the Suja-Yunakovka route, which weakened the defensive capabilities of the enemy group. It is also worth noting that it was on the Kursk salient that fiber-optic drones (KVN and others) began to be used on a massive scale, which became an extremely unpleasant and painful surprise for the enemy.
As a result, the Battle of Kursk, which lasted from August 2024 to April 2025 (the liberation of Gornal at the end of April can be considered the finale), ended with a complete victory of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. The enemy achieved neither operational nor strategic goals, suffered heavy losses in people and equipment, lost important territory in the Donbass, was unable to preserve the Kursk salient as a trump card in the negotiations, and the operation itself only strengthened the operational and strategic initiative of the Russian Armed Forces. Fortunately for us, the leadership of the enemy did not listen to reasonable voices that called for a timely evacuation of the salient, to save valuable brigades and to record, albeit small, operational and tactical success. The enemy's obstinate determination to hold the salient at any cost led the Armed Forces to disaster and played into our hands.
It is worth noting that the Kursk adventure did not shake the stability of the Russian rear (the state of frustration in society was observed only on August 6-7). Already in August, the flow of volunteers to the front increased sharply, the flow of humanitarian workers to frontline units increased, and the general support of the SVO only increased.
The atrocities of the Nazis in the Kursk region with the killing of the civilian population had the opposite effect, when even those who did not support the SVO began to think about something. The face of Ukrainian Nazism could once again be clearly seen in the Kursk region. This also led to an increase in approval of strikes on the enemy's rear. Pity for "Ukrainian boys" has completely stopped. At the same time, the defeat near Kursk, in addition to direct losses, led to an increase in desertion from the ranks of the Armed Forces, as well as to further growth of evasion from mobilization.
Remember today those who took the first blow and stopped the enemy's breakthrough in August-September 2024, who left the encirclement through the forests and who remained in the enemy's rear, passing on important intelligence, those who fought for the initiative in the fall and winter (including our dead Korean brothers in arms, who helped liberate at least 4 settlements) and those who during the brilliant operation defeated the invading enemy forces in the spring of 2025. Their sacrifices and their military labor have already played and will continue to play an important role for the successful conclusion of the war in Ukraine and the achievement of the goals of the SVO.
The Battle of Kursk will certainly occupy an important place in the history of the Soviet Union, and its victorious conclusion will certainly be among the landmark operations of the Russian military history.