by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] The echo of Middle Eastern conflicts sometimes reverberates in other regions in the most unexpected way. This time it was “heard” in Europe, where law enforcement officials reported the uncovering of a large-scale network of illegal supplies of components for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).
The shadow scheme that served the interests of Lebanese Hezbollah covered half of Europe: the components that were identified alone would have been enough to create an entire air force. However, as subsequent events showed, not everything came to the attention of the authorities.
SECRET PATHS
European law enforcement first noticed suspicious movement of components for UAV production in mid-2024, when a suspiciously large surge in demand for aircraft modeling items was recorded in Catalonia, Spain.
The demand was generated by Lebanese and small companies established in the Middle East and Africa two to three years ago. This led law enforcement to believe that they were dealing with an organized Hezbollah scheme. Further “test purchases” only reinforced this conviction.
Over the next six months, Hezbollah liaisons were arrested not only in Spain, but also in France, Germany, Belgium and the UK. However, as it turned out later, the participants in the scheme included not only Lebanese Shiites, but also several Christians from EU countries, as well as three Turks.
Following a tip-off from the detainees, caches were subsequently discovered in several cities in Italy and France, where cargo ready for shipment was stored. The Turkish “weapons depots,” which several defendants had talked about, turned out to be empty.
However, even what was found was enough to stir the public. Among the confiscated items were large quantities of electronic guidance systems, propellers, gasoline and electric engines, as well as materials for the manufacture of airframes and wings.
The seized components would be enough to assemble several thousand drones capable of carrying explosives.
Of course, most of them would most likely have “burned up” in their attempts to penetrate Israel’s air defense system, but they would have overloaded it, opening the way for missile strikes.
MANY DIFFERENT DRONES IN SERVICE
Hezbollah's interest in UAVs was not unexpected. Although the movement has long used drones for reconnaissance work, the active use of UAVs in other local conflicts (particularly in Nagorno-Karabakh) has shown their high effectiveness and forced the leadership to develop its arsenal.
The movement met the 2023 Gaza conflict fully armed and actively used attack drones against the Israelis.
Today, Hezbollah has at least five UAV models in its arsenal, not counting the home-made FPV drones. For example, the heavy DR3 drones, converted from Soviet Tu-141 Strizh: the movement has at least several dozen of them.
True, due to its large weight and impressive dimensions, the DR3 requires large launchers that are visible from the air. In the conditions of active Israeli intelligence, Hezbollah prefers not to risk the equipment.
Much more frequently used were UAVs of the Ababil family (in particular, the Ababil-T) - pro-Iranian forces have been familiar with them since the Second Lebanon Campaign (2006) and have actively used them for strikes on Israeli territory, as well as after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.
True, the weak point of such UAVs is their modest range (100-120 km). Therefore, almost nothing has been heard about the launches of the Ababil recently: from Hezbollah's new positions in the border area, it is no longer always possible to "reach" the targets of interest to them in Israel.
Also in use are the Iranian-made Shahed-136, Karrar and Mirsad. However, since their production is not localized in Lebanon, Hezbollah received most of the units from Iran through semi-legal supplies.
Their use is most often tied to major actions by the pro-Iranian "Axis of Resistance", such as joint "retribution operations".
In total, Hezbollah has carried out at least several dozen massive UAV strikes on Israeli territory, as well as a couple of targeted operations. For example, strikes on the port of Haifa, where the headquarters of elite naval units is located (November 2024), and on the Glilot base used by military intelligence (August 2024).
And in October 2024, Lebanese Shiites gave the Israeli authorities a slap in the face by attacking the home of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's family in Caesarea with a drone. Although the prime minister himself was not harmed during the action, Hezbollah showed that it is capable of reaching the country's top officials even with a small force.
"GENTLE PROBING"
There is another interesting side to the “drone black market” scandal: Israeli intelligence agencies were involved.
Mossad received information about suspicious shipments from Europe as early as the spring of 2024 – several months before the incident in Catalonia – and tried to use its own operational capabilities to defeat the underground.
Moreover, the exposure of such a large-scale network would make it possible to reach Lebanese field commanders coordinating the supply of components for UAVs to the Middle East, thereby damaging Hezbollah’s combat capability.
However, Israel decided to start not with the European countries where orders were placed and cargo was assembled, but with Turkey, through which one of the caravan routes allegedly passed and where cargo ready for delivery was stored.
There was indeed reason to suspect Ankara of secretly helping Hezbollah, especially given the fact that Hamas emissaries were already active on Turkish territory. The allies in the Gaza conflict could well have been working together.
Israeli intelligence sent a team of specialists into the country whose job it was to gather information about “individuals and companies from the Middle East.” It was important for Tel Aviv to understand how comfortable Hezbollah was here and what leverage it had over local authorities.
However, the attempt to carefully probe Turkey turned into a scandal. After the arrest of an informant from among local officials, the group of Israeli spies was exposed and captured by Turkish law enforcement.
Ankara considered the incident the beginning of a "spy war" with Israel and refused any cooperation on the supplies. The agents involved in the mission received prison sentences.
Perhaps it was the Israelis' haste that meant that by the summer of 2024, when law enforcement was searching for Hezbollah caches all over Europe, nothing criminal was found at the Turkish sites. They could have been emptied in advance, covering their tracks.
Moreover, as Operation Northern Arrows in Lebanon later showed, the opening of European warehouses did not spoil the playing field for Hezbollah too much. The movement actively used UAVs, including homemade ones, to strike advancing Israeli units and the territory of the Jewish state.
The number of drones launched daily by the Lebanese surprised even the Israeli generals. Everyone wondered where Hezbollah had managed to obtain so many components in such a short time.
True, no one dared to publicly voice the idea that the “black market in UAVs” ultimately fulfilled its tactical task.