by Leonid Tsukanov
[REGNUM] On the night of December 19, Israeli aircraft launched a massive strike on Yemeni territory controlled by the pro-Iranian Ansar Allah (Houthis) movement. The strike targeted port and energy infrastructure. However, Israel is becoming less and less fond of striking from afar as time goes on.
They could always go after the Houthis’ supplier…Air strikes are not cheap, and their destructive effect is not that great.
| Not great? How would the writer define great in this context? |
PREEMPTIVE STRIKES
The Israeli airstrike was the third major attack on the Houthis since they formally joined the Axis of Resistance. The Israeli army (IDF) carried out massive strikes on several military targets, including the ports of Ras Issa, Hodeidah and As-Salif, and on energy infrastructure in Sanaa.
In addition, several sea tugboats used by the Houthis in anti-Israeli operations were hit for the first time.
| All of the tugboats, was the Israeli claim. |
| Fourteen spear tips, plus all those other things that made up the tail. Having accomplished it three times over Yemen, they could — in theory, at least — take a left toward, say, Iran… |
Another interesting point is that for the first time in a long time, the Israeli operation was not a direct response to the Houthi attacks. By the time the next missile launch from Yemen began, IDF fighters were already approaching their targets.
Such changes indicate a change in the Israeli approach to actions in the Yemeni direction and the emergence of a greater “offensiveness” in their actions.
FROM HEAVEN TO EARTH
Israeli strikes on Yemeni territory have become larger and more destructive. This is acknowledged by the Houthi representatives who commented on the results of the latest raid. However, as is well known, aviation does not win wars. Especially when, due to Yemen's territorial remoteness, Israeli aircraft have to make a big detour, which inevitably leads to an increase in the cost of the operation.
Moreover, when comparing the cost of the operations with the actual destruction on the ground (and the damage from subsequent retaliatory actions by the Houthis), the effectiveness of the strikes raises more and more questions.
This, in turn, is giving rise to a debate about their appropriateness both in the General Staff and in the country's ruling circles. And although the Israeli opposition has not yet directly accused Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of extravagance, such attacks are unlikely to take long to come - as was previously the case with Gaza and Lebanon.
However, despite criticism from inside and outside the country, Israel has followed Lebanon with a ground operation in Syria. Thus, we see that Netanyahu is trying to squeeze the maximum out of the situation in the region by launching successive strikes against forces hostile to Israel. Given the experience of previous campaigns, sooner or later the Israeli leadership will face the question of a ground operation against the Ansar Allah movement.
| I realize I have no military background and am therefore not qualified to judge, but that sounds nuts to me. |
The most obvious is the use of territories of countries neighboring Yemen as a springboard, primarily Saudi Arabia, which has the longest land border with Yemeni territories.
The expulsion of the Houthis from Sanaa (especially by proxy) would allow the Saudis to finally remove the issue of the “Yemeni threat” from the agenda and no longer worry about the security of their oil-producing regions, which have been repeatedly attacked by the Ansar Allah movement in the past.
Interest in this version is fueled, in particular, by rumors of a “strategic breakthrough” in negotiations on the possible normalization of relations between Tel Aviv and Riyadh.
| Ah. Those Joooo-loving Saudis, enemies of our friends from Iran. Got it. |
However, such an open accession to the anti-Iranian front on the side of Israel does not fit into the general line that the Saudi leadership is trying to build. Largely because it would destroy all previous agreements with Tehran, and would again put Riyadh in a dependent position on the United States.
The second option involves creating a “jump-off point” in close proximity to Houthi targets, for example, on the Socotra archipelago, which is under the tacit control of the Emirates.
Previously, work on a joint base with Israel on the archipelago was frozen at the initiative of the UAE (as Abu Dhabi’s contribution to the inter-Yemeni settlement), but in case of urgent need, the facilities could be deployed again.
The appearance of Israeli forces on Socotra, although it will greatly simplify strikes on Houthi targets, will not be of much help in conducting a ground operation. The transfer of large forces through Socotra to the "mainland" will have to be organized literally under the close gaze of the enemy, which will deprive the Israelis of the element of surprise.
At the same time, the option of inviting a “limited Israeli contingent” into the country for joint counteraction to the Houthis from alternative centers of power (loyal to Saudi Arabia, the Emirates or Turkey) is considered utopian.
In Yemeni society, despite its segmentation, anti-Israeli sentiments and a sense of solidarity with the Palestinian people are still strong. In this regard, any attempts to legitimize the presence of Israeli units on Yemeni territory will be perceived with hostility, which will not add support to the already weakened factions.
Israel still has to find the key to the Yemeni and Arabian elites; otherwise, Tel Aviv will have to continue to threaten the Houthis exclusively from afar.