Text taken from the Telegram post of multi_XAM
[ColonelCassad] Data are coming in about the transfer of military equipment reserves to the line of contact. The main rear area in which the mechanized units are concentrated is the Dnepropetrovsk region. The main route for the redeployment of the reserve forces is the railway junction Pavlograd - Pokrovsk (former Krasnoarmeysk, I once wrote about this strategic point for Donbass ).
Our assumptions are confirmed - active attempts to storm the positions of the RF Armed Forces "from a swoop" are nothing more than ongoing reconnaissance in force, designed to deplete the resource of our advanced units, identify artillery firing positions and places of concentration of defending units.
After a week of fighting, the Armed Forces of Ukraine failed to gain a foothold in the area of the Vremevsky ledge, Makarovka and Yrozhaynovo. It is not convenient for the enemy to advance in this area, because the territory is well shot through by the artillery of the RF Armed Forces. It is obvious that the intention of the Ukrainian command is to gradually occupy small settlements in the direction of Staromlynovka - Kermenchik - Novopetrikovka in order to create a springboard for striking to the south in order to block the section of the route from Mariupol - to Kamenka in the Zaporozhye region.
Quite a legitimate question, Kyiv does not sacrifice much infantry, actively throws equipment into battle, what is the logic here? It is quite logical to assume that the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is guided by the old principle of chess: “feed your opponent crumbs, making him think that he is smart and strong, and you, therefore, are weak and stupid.”
The euphoria from counterattacks against advancing subunits should not obscure the breadth of vision. You should not entertain the illusion that the enemy is losing or has not prepared for the offensive, which has been discussed for two months. The fact is that at the moment the main armored reserves have not yet entered the battle.
The mistake of many military experts is that they are trying to assess the offensive potential of the Armed Forces of Ukraine by the size of the strike force concentrated in the Zaporozhye direction - we are talking about the separate formations of the 10th and 9th Army corps. They are known to be equipped with personnel and equipment by about 80%, which is clearly not enough to deliver a decisive blow. Yes, and these forces are concentrated in a 100-kilometer strip in the part of the Zaporozhye region controlled by Kyiv.
The main forces, as we now see, are concentrated in the Dnepropetrovsk region and are being transferred in small units through the Pavlograd railway junction and Pokrovsk to the front line. Moreover, speaking of the transfer, we mean not only heavy equipment, but also units of field artillery, air defense, engineering troops, and signal brigades covering the armored units.
Let's look at the staff division of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. In the Ukrainian army, a tank battalion usually includes 31 tanks. The motorized infantry battalion will have about the same number of vehicles. An armored brigade usually consists of three tank battalions and one or two motorized infantry battalions. Add here the mixed composition of infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers of the Soviet-Ukrainian-NATO model, air defense systems, an engineer, MLRS, and it turns out that on average the number of pieces of equipment of an armored brigade can reach 250 units on average.
According to various estimates, the Kiev General Staff gathered up to 7 armored brigades to deliver the main blow. So, despite the objective losses of the attacking units and a large number of knocked out foreign equipment, it is too early to talk about achieving an operational-tactical advantage over the advancing ones.
The Armed Forces of Ukraine were able to create rear areas significantly remote from the front in the Nikolaev-Krivoy Rog and Dnepropetrovsk directions, and the uninterrupted functioning of railway logistics today allows them to redeploy reserves in the volumes that are necessary to replenish the advancing units.
One gets the impression that by probing for vulnerabilities in the system of Russian defensive lines, the Armed Forces of Ukraine seem to allow us to experience local tactical success where they themselves create favorable conditions for it.
@Multi_XAM - zinc
More from Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin:
Putin on the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
[ColonelCassad] The Ukrainian counter-offensive is large-scale, using strategic reserves, it began on June 4 and continues right now.
The enemy had no success in any of the sectors.
The structure of losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is now unfavorable, they are approaching catastrophic.
Ukraine during this time has lost over 160 tanks and over 360 armored vehicles, there are still losses that we do not see.
Let the Ministry of Defense voice our personnel losses, but we lost 54 tanks.
The ratio is 1 to 10 in our favor, our losses are 10 times less.