By David Rothkopf
Strategic redeployment. Phased drawdown. Exit strategy. However one phrases it, Washington seems to be turning a page in the story of Iraq. The midterm elections, the subsequent resignation of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and the release of the Iraq Study Group's report last week all suggest that the transformational objectives that led U.S. forces into Iraq are being supplanted by an unmistakable and bipartisan desire to bring troops home, end this mess and move on.
That impulse, while understandable, reflects the national narcissism that dogs much of U.S. foreign policy. We think Iraq is about us. We made it happen and we can undo it. But one-sided solutions for ending the Iraq war are as unrealistic as the one-sided impulses that started it. Even as we seek to remake history, it is remaking us.
The economic and political forces that drew the United States into Iraq -- quite different from the reasons the Bush administration gave for the invasion -- remain powerful, exerting a pull that will be hard to resist. Oil, of course, is foremost among them. But also important are the threats and tensions linked to oil: Washington's decades-old rivalry with Iran, the growing dangers posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the fear that the Middle East's simmering conflicts will erupt into a broader, bloodier and far more costly war.
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