Too good to summarize; go read it all.
Okay, here's a taste:
. . . the principal utility of this report is its succinct description of the internal and external players in Iraq and an outline of their respective goals, many of which are malevolent. As a guide to the game the ISG Report is first rate. However, the study recommendations are extremely disappointing.
The report concludes from the outset that the failure of local and regional actors to act rationally,and not any obviously crazy American policy, lies at the heart of Iraqi instability and the threat of regional Sunni and Shi’a clashes. The question is whether any American redeployment — any American policy for that matter — can alter this given the premise? Not obviously, but it doesn’t keep the ISG from trying.
The heart of ISGÂ’s proposed solution is to add moving parts to the problem. . . .
The normal approach to a difficult problem would be to bound or simplify it. But the ISG recommendations try the exact opposite: it adds complexity to the already complex situation. . . . |