[BB] A report by Crime Prevention Research Center (CPRC) president John Lott shows armed citizens stopped a third of all “active shooter incidents” from 2014 through 2025.
Lott then presented the CPRC data as a correction to FBI reports which claim armed citizens only topped 3.9 percent of the incidents.
He noted that during his time in the Department of Justice during President Trump’s first term, his duties “included evaluating the FBI’s active-shooter reports.” In so doing, he “discovered that the reports omitted or misclassified numerous cases in which armed civilians stopped attacks.”
Lott noted the FBI identified 418 “active shooter incidents” from 2014 through 2025 and credited armed citizens with stopping only 16 of them. CPRC, on the other hand, “identified 615 active-shooter incidents from 2014 through 2025 and found that armed citizens stopped 225 of them.”
Moreover, Lott wrote, “We excluded another 35 cases in which law-abiding armed citizens stopped attackers before they could fire a shot.”
Lott made clear the impetus for releasing this information was the establishment media’s coverage of the armed father who stopped the October 15, 2026, Silver Rail Elementary School attack. He pointed to an AP report on the incident which began, “Few mass shootings in the U.S. end like the deadly attack on an Oregon elementary school: with an armed civilian opening fire on the gunman.”
The AP gets information on “active shooter incidents” from the same database the FBI uses.
[FOX] I led a platoon of infantrymen in the 10th Mountain Division in Bermel, a rugged district in Afghanistan’s Paktika province on the Pakistan border. Our mission was the one American infantry carried for generations: close with and destroy the enemy.
We protected the Afghan people by doing exactly that: waging war against the enemy who would have harmed them. Their safety was the result. War was the job.
Every soldier in my platoon knew it. In combat, the fog of war settles over everything. Plans break. Radios fail. Young leaders make life-or-death decisions with no time to ask for guidance. What carries them through is a mission so clear that no one has to wonder what it is.
That is why the name matters. "Department of War" states the mission from the very top: our military exists to fight and win the nation’s wars.
The president has acted. Now Congress must finish the job. The House and the Senate Armed Services Committee have both backed restoring the Department of War name in this year’s defense bill. Lawmakers should keep it in the final version and send it to the president’s desk. The name of the institution that sends Americans to fight belongs in law, not just in an executive order.
[American Thinker] As France was already burning, from October 6 to 8, a statue bearing the dual names "Orange Plague" and "King of Injustice," supposedly representing President Trump, presided over the busy hall connecting the European Parliament’s two buildings in Strasbourg. Despite the nobility of the materials used—bronze covered with 23-carat gold leaf—no expert was needed to see that this monstrosity has nothing artistic about it, but instead stems from the irrational, indeed childish, hatred felt by the "artist," the Dane Jens Galschiot, for the U.S. president—the man and his political positions.
Galschiot is no Michelangelo, nor is he Rodin. His school would be closer to that of Botero, at least in terms of size, since the pedestal and statue together reach 8.5 feet. The "work" is a typical example of the Non-Art favoured in our post-modernist world, where lack of talent is compensated for by the desire to shock, stupendous cheek, and stupidity.
Also, by political pretension and the rewriting of the classics.
Let us dissect the thing. Galschiot has produced an ugly, obese Trump in an obscene pose, sitting on a fragile man, and naked, the "artist" explains, like the king in Andersen’s tale, because he sees Trump as a modern version of that king.
On the pedestal, the following words are engraved: "I am sitting on the back of a man. He is sinking under my burden. I will do anything to help him. Except stepping down from his back." The inscription is signed "The King of Injustice."
Explaining his creation, Galschiot also declares that Trump represents one of the greatest threats to the rules-based international order, democratic values, and common efforts to resolve the climate crisis.
[YouTube] In this overview, Mike Steger examines President Trump's strategy toward Ukraine, Europe's energy crisis, and the growing political battle ahead of the 2026 midterm elections. He explores how European refinery closures, Germany's nuclear shutdown, and disruptions to global fuel supplies have contributed to rising energy costs and political tensions.
Mike also examines Trump's confrontation with establishment Republicans, including Karl Rove, Thom Tillis, and other GOP figures critical of his foreign policy. He argues that the struggle inside the Republican Party is part of a broader political realignment, with Trump's approach to Ukraine challenging longstanding alliances and priorities.
Looking beyond the midterms, Mike discusses the upcoming APEC and G20 summits, potential negotiations involving Russia and China, and proposals for a new international economic system built around energy production, industrial growth, and economic development.
[NYP] "This is what happens when nations let wealth and power accumulate in the hands of a few," says prospective 2028 presidential candidate Rep. Ro Khanna about the mass rioting and social unrest unfolding in France.
As with most issues, the far-left Californian has it backward: The economic and social ideas dear to his own Democratic Party are what have destabilized France.
France, after all, is home to socialized medicine, high minimum wages, powerful unions, some of the most generous worker protections in the world, big government spending and a massive welfare state.
France’s Gini index, the standard measure of income inequality, is just under 32, around the European Union average.
Of course income inequality, the hobbyhorse of the American left, is completely irrelevant in and of itself; France ranks right in the middle worldwide by that measure, between the stable and wealthy Western democracy of Japan and the destitute Asian tyranny of Myanmar.
Trump is trying to keep IRAN from building and/o having Nuclear weapons.
* France has approximately 290 nukes in its arsenal.
* The United Kingdom has about 225 nukes.
Both countries are already under internal attack by Iranian supported radicals.
=========================================
OBTW: the USSR had ##,000 nuclear weapons (which included Nuke artillery shells and Nuke 1+KT briefcase bombs) at one point. As we know, nowhere near those numbers were accounted for, after the breakup.
[WorldIsraelNews] With no credible international commitment to forcibly disarm Hamas, Israel must annex Gaza rather than rely on temporary military control or unenforceable security guarantees.
By Jonathan Pollard
The question of “the day after” in Gaza has moved from theoretical debate to unavoidable reality, forced by a stark admission from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Netanyahu recently revealed that efforts to find an international force willing to step in and disarm Hamas have completely failed.
Despite challenging American officials to identify a willing coalition, months of searching yielded a definitive answer: no country is prepared to take on this mission.
Consequently, Netanyahu stated that the mission falls squarely on Israel, regardless of the heavy casualties the IDF may endure to destroy Hamas entirely.
This reality exposes a profound moral contradiction at the heart of the international community’s approach to Gaza.
Foreign governments expect Israel to eliminate Hamas, a mission that may require further Israeli casualties, enormous financial resources, and prolonged military operations. Yet many of those same governments insist that Israel surrender control over the political and security arrangements that follow.
In other words, Israel is expected to pay the price of victory while others reserve the right to determine what that victory will mean.
This is not merely unreasonable. It is morally indefensible.
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY’S DOUBLE STANDARD
For years, Israel has been urged to place its security in the hands of international arrangements, diplomatic guarantees, and foreign institutions. Yet when the moment arrives to confront an entrenched terrorist organization, the willingness of those institutions to assume the necessary risks becomes considerably less apparent.
The international community has proposed stabilization forces, civilian administrations, reconstruction authorities, and elaborate diplomatic frameworks. What remains unanswered is who will actually confront Hamas if its fighters refuse to surrender their weapons or relinquish their military infrastructure.
Would foreign soldiers enter Gaza’s neighborhoods to confiscate weapons? Would their governments accept the casualties such operations could entail? And would they authorize their forces to continue fighting when international condemnation inevitably begins?
These are not secondary questions. They are the difference between a genuine security solution and another diplomatic illusion.
Israel cannot entrust the survival of its southern communities to arrangements whose enforcement depends on governments unwilling to make the sacrifices necessary to sustain them.
WHY THE FAMILIAR ALTERNATIVES CANNOT SUCCEED
The destruction of Hamas’s military capabilities, however essential, will not resolve Gaza’s future by itself. Israel must confront the geographical, demographic, and political realities that have repeatedly frustrated attempts to establish a durable security arrangement.
Allowing Gaza unrestricted maritime access would create opportunities for renewed weapons smuggling unless Israel retained effective control over the coastline and its approaches. Any future maritime arrangement must prevent terrorist organizations from rebuilding their arsenals.
The Egyptian alternative is equally problematic. Cairo has consistently rejected proposals involving the mass movement of Gaza’s population into Sinai, citing security concerns, sovereignty, and the danger of permanent Palestinian displacement.
Israel cannot build its security strategy around the assumption that Egypt will suddenly reverse this position.
Nor can voluntary emigration provide an immediate or comprehensive solution. Other countries have shown little willingness to accept large numbers of permanent residents from Gaza, while regional governments remain opposed to arrangements they believe could permanently alter the Palestinian national question.
Nevertheless, Gazans who genuinely wish to leave should be permitted to do so through lawful, voluntary arrangements with countries willing to receive them. Such departures must remain a matter of individual choice rather than coercion.
The idea that Gaza can simply be handed to a new Palestinian administration is no more reassuring.
Replacing Hamas’s formal government without eliminating its armed networks, financial influence, and capacity for intimidation would risk recreating the conditions that allowed the organization to dominate Gaza in the first place.
A civilian administration operating under the shadow of Hamas’s surviving weapons would not represent a genuine alternative to Hamas rule. It would merely provide a new administrative facade behind which the same threat could eventually reemerge.
WHY MILITARY CONTROL ALONE IS INSUFFICIENT
Some will argue that Israel can retain indefinite military control over Gaza without formally annexing the territory. This may appear to offer a convenient compromise, preserving Israeli security authority while avoiding the diplomatic consequences of sovereignty.
But such an arrangement would leave Gaza’s ultimate political status unresolved and Israel responsible for defending a territory whose future would remain subject to international negotiation.
It would also preserve the dangerous assumption that Israeli military control is inherently temporary, something to be reduced or surrendered whenever sufficient diplomatic pressure accumulates.
We have already witnessed the consequences of treating territorial withdrawal as a substitute for genuine security.
In 2005, Israel dismantled its communities in Gaza, removed its permanent military installations, and withdrew its ground forces. Supporters of disengagement argued that separating Israel from Gaza would reduce friction and improve Israel’s security.
Instead, Hamas seized control of the territory in 2007, built an extensive military infrastructure, and transformed Gaza into a base for rocket attacks, tunnel warfare, and terrorism.
On October 7, 2023, Hamas terrorists crossed into southern Israel and carried out the deadliest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust.
Disengagement did not make that atrocity inevitable. But it demonstrated the catastrophic danger of relinquishing territorial control without establishing a security arrangement capable of preventing a terrorist organization from exploiting the resulting vacuum.
Israel cannot afford to repeat that experiment.
For this reason, I believe Israel must move beyond temporary military administration and establish permanent sovereignty over Gaza.
Annexation would not automatically eliminate terrorism, nor would it relieve Israel of the responsibilities accompanying control over a civilian population. It would, however, establish that Israel’s security presence is not a temporary bargaining chip awaiting the next diplomatic initiative.
THE DIFFICULT QUESTION OF GAZA’S CIVILIAN POPULATION
Annexation necessarily raises a question that cannot be avoided: what becomes of the Arab population remaining in Gaza?
The answer cannot be another arrangement that allows Hamas to rebuild its military infrastructure among civilians, using residential neighborhoods as cover for weapons, tunnels, and terrorist operations. Israel must establish security conditions that prevent such a threat from reemerging.
That would require secure civilian areas, effective screening for weapons and armed operatives, restrictions around sensitive military zones, and permanent Israeli oversight of Gaza’s security infrastructure.
But permanent security control also carries permanent responsibilities. Gaza’s residents would require housing, medical care, education, employment, and functioning civilian institutions.
Security measures must distinguish between civilians and those directly involved in terrorism rather than impose indiscriminate confinement.
Annexation would also force Israel to confront the legal and political status of Gaza’s residents, including their civil rights, freedom of movement, representation, and eligibility for citizenship or permanent residency.
These questions cannot be indefinitely postponed, because sovereignty entails obligations as well as authority.
The international community should contribute substantially to the humanitarian and reconstruction costs. Israel should also facilitate lawful, genuinely voluntary emigration for those wishing to establish their lives elsewhere, provided receiving countries agree.
None of this will be simple or inexpensive. But the difficulties of administering Gaza cannot justify returning to a security arrangement that allows another terrorist army to emerge along Israel’s southern border.
ISRAEL MUST DETERMINE ITS OWN FUTURE
The central question is whether any proposed arrangement can provide lasting security for the communities of southern Israel.
For too long, Israel has been asked to accept promises in place of enforceable security, international supervision in place of sovereign responsibility, and diplomatic optimism in place of strategic reality.
Annexation will bring serious diplomatic, economic, legal, and administrative challenges. These must be acknowledged and addressed. But indefinite uncertainty, with Gaza’s future perpetually subject to outside pressure and the possibility of renewed terrorist control, carries dangers of its own.
Israel cannot continue sacrificing its soldiers to eliminate threats only to surrender the strategic gains of those sacrifices at the negotiating table.
If the international community is unwilling to undertake the dangerous mission of disarming Hamas, it must recognize that Israel will make the decisions necessary to secure its own future.
October 7 demonstrated the terrible price of allowing a terrorist army to entrench itself along Israel’s border.
The next arrangement for Gaza must be judged not by the diplomatic applause it receives, but by whether it prevents that nightmare from ever being repeated.
Israel has already paid too high a price for the illusion that someone else will guarantee its security. It cannot afford to gamble the lives of its citizens on that illusion again.
Since Israel annexed East Jerusalem in 1967, the Arab residents have been offered the choice to become Israeli citizens, with all the rights thereto, or remain subjects of the Palestinian Authority. Almost all rejected Israeli citizenship, despite the decided advantages — but they aren’t as duplicitous as the Hamasniks have already shown themselves to be.
#3
Be better if the European Jews returned to Europe
Look at the situation in Europe now, with Moslem colonists rampaging through the streets. Can you imagine the European governments that cannot find the spine to drive out their conquering Moslems would welcome back the half of Israel’s Jews descended from those who fled from there two generations ago — 4 million Israeli Jewish immigrants?
In the second half of 1948 almost the entire remnant of Europe’s Jews — some 800,000 men, women, and children— moved en masse to Israel following the declaration of independence because for the three years following the end of WWII they had sat in the DP camps in Germany that were actually renamed Nazi concentration camps, because no country in the entire world would let them in.
The Jews who left Europe cannot go back. And the nearly a million Jews driven out of the Moslem Middle East can also not go back — all those countries made it illegal for them to return.
#4
all those countries made it illegal for them to return.
"Well, of course we did. After all, they're Zionists who might sneak off and colonize Palestine, and we couldn't possibly be a party to that!
Say, sorry for confusion the other evening. I've never set foot in Jordan. Was jabbering about the recently-attacked IC in SD that had been mentioned upthread.
Might get there soon, though, health permitting, since the Hashemite democracy next door heads my list.
[MeaningInHistory] First we had the Mother Of All Bombs. Then we had the Mother Of All Bubbles—and, actually, that MOAB is still with us. Now could it be the Mother Of All Bluffs?
Yeah, I know that Trump keeps saying and doing things that make it sound exactly like we’re seeing the prelude to renewed bombing on Iran. But what would you do if you were trying to bluff Iran? I mean, really trying to bluff Iran. Or maybe really trying to bluff voters in USrael? You’d do exactly what Trump is now doing. Now, maybe you’re not a psychopath, so you’d balk at the abuse of military personnel and diplomats and their familes—none of which fazes Trump. But if you were Trump—hell yeah, you’d do all of that without batting an eyelash. Or maybe without even taking your Trumpian eye off, um, “the physicality of other men”.
My bottom line has always been that if there actually were a viable military option for success against Iran Trump would have taken that option already. The military option isn’t there—as John Mearsheimer eloquently maintains on a regular basis—and it’s not getting better with time. To the contrary. Trump isn’t actually stupid, and I don’t think he’s suicidal—despite having put himself into a suicidal position. Yes, he’s getting pretty old, and that exposes his deviant personality more clearly than before. But, as Danny Davis points out today, Trump was always told that the military option would not work. We couldn’t get at those Iranian deep nuclear sites and we wouldn’t be able to bomb Iran back to the stone age. None of that worked in the Twelve Day War and it definitely didn’t work in the Forty Day Followup.
Do see what I mean? In a sense you could say that it was always a gamble, except that the gamble wasn’t a military one. Trump knew that the military action wasn’t able to generate an actual military victory. Instead it was a political gamble—a gamble that Trump could bluff his way to a regime change in Iran before running out of standoff munitions. But that looks very much like it was a bluff directed at the Iranians. Trump wants everyone in the world to think that he’s a mad risk taker, but that’s the basic bluff. China didn’t fall for it. Russia hasn’t fallen for it. And Iran certainly hasn’t fallen for it. In retrospect, the war on Iran looks like a mad gamble, but at the time the likelihood is that Trump was persuaded that the military bluff really would result in regime change. In his hubris he thought it was making a rational calculation, based on the success of the Venezuela kidnapping, but he was wrong.
And that makes you wonder whether, as suggested above, the bluff is directed more at domestic USraeli pre-election audiences than at Iran.
Bolding for emphasis is mine. Whether consciously or unconsciously, the writer is a Jew-hating tool of Iran.
Posted by: Dopey Photch2701 ||
10/26/2026 07:59 ||
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#1
[AI] how many supertankers are there
As of late 2026, there are approximately **750 to 950 supertankers** in operation worldwide, with an additional **262** on order.
* **Operational Fleet**: Estimates vary by source, with some reports citing **750–768** supertankers (defined as vessels over 250,000 DWT) and others stating **about 950**.
* **Specific Classes**: The global fleet includes **810** Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) and **396** tankers exceeding 300,000 deadweight tons (DWT).
* **New Construction**: Shipowners have placed record orders for **262** new supertankers, surpassing the previous peak set in 2008.
#2
Does anyone know if the 1/28th claim is true? I have no idea.
Not to mention that being attacked is not the same as being significantly damaged… or destroyed. So a) is it true, and b) if true does it matter.
Separately, Israel has plans for finishing off the Mullahcracy that do not require American involvement, though tag-teaming is much more fun. So at root it isn’t a problem if we turn our attention to other situations — the writer’s concerns are a non-issue.
Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited by Leonid Tsukanov
[Regnum] Over the past few days, increased attention has once again focused on Syria. More specifically, on the southwestern province of As-Suwayda, home to the Druze minority. The elites loyal to Israel who control the region and Damascus are teetering on the brink of open conflict, accusing each other of covertly preparing a new campaign.
Meanwhile, the Israeli prime minister boasts to the world about his status as the defender of Druze interests. This, however, is hardly conducive to stabilizing the situation.
THE SITUATION IS GETTING TENSE
Although relations between the Druze and the new Syrian administration were rocky from the start (including a series of large-scale military clashes in 2024–2025), they were successfully brought into a state of “cold peace” by 2026.
Damascus tacitly approved the semi-autonomous status of As-Suwayda and even withdrew most of its military and police units from it in exchange for an end to Druze militia guerrilla raids into the surrounding areas.
However, in recent weeks, the situation has escalated again. By the end of September, Syrian troops had completed their "reconquest" of territories previously controlled by the Kurds and turned their attention to the only remaining opposition center—As-Suwayda.
Units loyal to Damascus gradually began to converge on bases located in areas adjacent to the province. Under the pretext of the increased activity of radical cells, the counter-terrorism regime in the southwest was strengthened.
In response, the Druze eloquently reiterated their political orientation and the powerful patrons behind them. For example, on the third anniversary of the Hamas attack on the Jewish state, pro-Israel demonstrations took place throughout As-Suwayda—local activists carried portraits of Israeli politicians, flags of the Jewish state and the local government, and shouted curses at Palestinian factions and Iran.
In Damascus, which did not officially support Hamas on the anniversary of the conflict, but publicly recalled the IDF's crimes in Gaza, the signal was considered hostile and the Druze were threatened with "serious consequences."
By mid-October, both sides had noticeably accelerated the transfer of troops to the line of contact under the pretext of “protection from provocations.”
DOZENS OF ISRAELI HELICOPTERS
Israel, seeking to better prepare the Druze for the coming war, is playing a significant role in escalating tensions around As-Suwayda. Over the past few days, dozens of IDF military helicopters have been spotted over As-Suwayda.
While their appearance was previously a relative rarity—single vehicles patrolling the buffer zone—now their operations have taken on the character of a full-fledged “air bridge.”
Local residents noted that most of the vehicles were heading to the Jebel al-Arab highlands, where they landed for unloading. Israeli engineering and radar units had previously been observed moving in these same areas.
A combination of indirect evidence suggests that Israel is establishing a full-fledged stronghold on the high ground. Unlike the forward outposts in Syria, this will serve as a full-fledged logistics hub and, at the same time, an "arsenal" for supplying the local armed opposition.
Moreover, Damascus is convinced that the establishment of a permanent base is a new step by Israel to create a permanent buffer zone on the border with the Jewish state. However, Israel clearly has no intention of "pecking off" the south itself. The Military Council of As-Suwayda, which governs the province, will do this for it.
Moreover, the Israeli-controlled fortification area is being heavily occupied by the National Guard of Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri, the de facto leader of the separatists in the area. Other residents of the province, especially Arabs, are strictly prohibited from approaching Jabal al-Arab.
Furthermore, on October 15 (shortly before the air maneuvers), a group of Druze elders from As-Suwayda visited the Golan Heights and met with Israeli officers. The agenda of the talks was not disclosed, but given the IDF maneuvers, it was unlikely to have been devoted to mundane matters. It's far more likely that at this meeting, local authorities received assurances from Israel that they would not be left alone to face the Syrian army.
A TRUMP CARD IN THE ELECTIONS
Potential instability in the Syrian-Israeli border region, regardless of who initiates it, would clearly play into the hands of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The latter recently casually recalled that it was he who saved the Druze minority from extermination by sending troops into Syria.
Moreover, a few days ago, the Israeli prime minister allegedly personally called Damascus and sternly advised President Ahmed al-Sharaa not to "poke the lion" and refrain from attempting to resolve differences with the Druze by force. Otherwise, he could one day suffer the same fate as the leaders of the Iranian regime.
Although the rhetoric of Netanyahu's opponents toward the Syrian side is also far from benevolent, the prime minister advocates decisive and proactive action, including the creation of a full-fledged Druze state in Syria.
From Netanyahu's perspective, such a move would allow him to create an additional cordon around Israel, thereby solving the security problem that has plagued the Jewish state almost since its inception. This would also attract the attention of a significant segment of the ultra-patriotic community, bolstering support ahead of the elections.
Moreover, protecting the "brotherly" Druze diaspora in Syria could increase loyalty to the current government in the Israeli Druze community (estimated at around 150,000 people), which traditionally supports the liberal camp.
What's also interesting is that the current prime minister doesn't even need to complete the operation to "crystallize" popular support—he only needs to demonstrate decisiveness on the eve of the elections to retain his post as prime minister and continue his previously established line of building a "Greater Israel."
The parliamentary opposition is turning a blind eye to these maneuvers, but is ready at any moment to condemn Netanyahu for igniting yet another war on the country's borders, the success of which, moreover, is not guaranteed.
Sure, but given that they happily condemn Bibi for breathing funny, that is not necessarily meaningful.
However, this last point will likely only be floated publicly if Israelis are forced to fight for Druze independence themselves. If this strategy succeeds, any attempts to criticize the authorities for their dangerous play will lead to accusations of defeatism and further divide the opposition camp.
A multi-volume chronology and reference guide set detailing three years of the Mexican Drug War between 2010 and 2012.
Rantburg.com and borderlandbeat.com correspondent and author Chris Covert presents his first non-fiction work detailing
the drug and gang related violence in Mexico.
Chris gives us Mexican press dispatches of drug and gang war violence
over three years, presented in a multi volume set intended to chronicle the death, violence and mayhem which has
dominated Mexico for six years.
Rantburg was assembled from recycled algorithms in the United States of America. No
trees were destroyed in the production of this weblog. We did hurt some, though. Sorry.
