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Africa North

A New Slogan: Want to Try It?

2010-04-17

[Asharq al-Aswat] A news item, published in this paper, stated that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is considering changing its famous slogan 'Islam is the solution' as a precaution against obstacles that it might face from the government, especially as articles within the constitution emphasise the danger of practicing politics based on religion. The news item adds that the Muslim Brotherhood is currently looking into the idea of adopting other slogans instead of or as well as 'Islam is the solution.' According to the news item, the Muslim Brotherhood said that "this slogan caused there to be many legal and political reservations." Muslim Brotherhood students at Egyptian universities had anticipated the MB's official idea or to be more specific, the MB's new position by using an alternative slogan, 'we hope for the best for Egypt' during the university student elections. They argued, as the news item indicates, that they coined that new slogan to alleviate security pressures. What was the position of the reformist figure in the Brotherhood leadership hierarchy, Essam al Eryan, towards this new youthful slogan? Al Eryan "decreed" that the new student slogan does not contradict the most cherished and sacred slogan of the Muslim Brotherhood, 'Islam is the solution.' He believes that the new slogan is part of a larger and more comprehensive slogan, namely, 'Islam is the solution.' It doesn't stop there. The Brotherhood mediator amazed us even further by stating that "every stage requires a different slogan." Al Eryan maintained that the slogan 'Islam is the solution' represents the identity of the Muslim Brotherhood. Of course the Muslim Brotherhood has its own way of interpreting this flagrant religious slogan and normalizing it within the civil state and I am talking about the constitution here not the regime because the MB is feeling this constitutional dilemma that lies at the core of these slogans and it came up with the following solution or ploy: whoever says that the 'Islam is the solution' slogan contradicts the constitution of the Egyptian state is wrong. These are the words of former Muslim Brotherhood Deputy Chairman Mohammed Habib. He believes that rejecting this slogan means rejecting the Egyptian constitution, the second article of which states that Islam is the official state religion. Habib says that those who oppose the slogan 'Islam is the solution' are actually "opposing and protesting the public order of the state." But, Mohammed Hassan Shaban, the journalist who wrote this news item, cleverly pointed out that Habib did not refer to the fifth clause of the constitution that he cited from that outlaws practicing politics based on religion. This controversy will never end; the theorists and politicians of the Muslim Brotherhood will always find a way out; they will always try verbal, emotional and constitutional tricks as well. This is not unusual with the Muslim Brotherhood and other bodies. We all remember how the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq dropped the word 'revolution' and opted for the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq. The then party leader Abdul Aziz al Hakim defended that change after securing enough votes for his party in the Iraqi parliament. We also recall how the Muslim Brotherhood in Kuwait, after the war of liberation in 1991, called itself the Islamic Constitutional Movement in order to ride the wave of increasing Kuwaiti patriotism and demanding a return to the constitution and parliamentary life in Kuwait after the invasion. Also in Iraq today, the State of Law Coalition headed by Nouri al Maliki is nothing but a façade for the fundamentalist Dawaa Party. Let us return to Egypt; perhaps all this can be understood in light of the vehemence of political rivalry for power and rule in Egypt, especially as parliamentary elections are drawing closer. The war of words intensifies and arguments are being debated by rivals in a climate of electoral and political conflict. My goal is not to recommend one Arab political party over another in Egypt or elsewhere as that is another topic altogether. Rather, the aim here is to reflect specifically on this clear "flexibility" in changing and altering slogans that are meant to be sacred and irrevocable, as their guardians have always claimed. What the Muslim Brotherhood is doing in Egypt and elsewhere is political manoeuvring and the person carrying out these manoeuvres is open to change and transformation. Even Essam al Eryan, in the middle of defending the Muslim Brotherhood's slogan change and its durability, acknowledged that there was flexibility and willingness towards change if the position of its rival, i.e. the Egyptian authorities, forces them to adopt that approach. If the authorities show tolerance, the Muslim Brotherhood would introduce their sacred slogan unabashed. But if the authorities show vigilance and strictness then the MB would search for another slogan that is suitable to that stage and its requirements, and does not negate the basis of the main slogan.

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Iraq

Maliki's position shaky as Baghdad leadership splits

2007-04-18

Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has his back against the wall. Last month, 15 members of the Fadhila party left the Shiite Alliance - al-Maliki's most important power base. Later, all six ministers of the movement led by the radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr left the government. Now al-Maliki has been forced to dismiss Defence Minister Abdul Kader al-Obeidi - a Sunni. Otherwise, the Iraqi Accord Front, which with 44 seats is the strongest party in parliament, threatened to withdraw its seven ministers as well as Deputy Prime Minister Salam al-Zubai. This would have meant the final break-up of the government. 'Al-Maliki will remain in office for another few months at most,' politicians were speculating at the Arab Summit in Riyadh in late March, where Iraq was represented by two Kurdish politicians - President Jalal Talabani and Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari. In fact, the Shiite prime minister is increasingly struggling to juggle US strategy, the power interests of rival Shiite parties, the influence of Iran, the Kurdish strive for independence and the constant criticism from dissatisfied Sunnis. Officially, the Sadr movement has justified its resignation from the government with al-Maliki's refusal to provide a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Iraq. But there is another reason why the Sadr followers are distancing themselves from the prime minister. In February and after hesitating for a long time, al- Maliki finally succumbed to pressure from Washington. Since then, US troops and the British military can more or less do as they wish in raids and attacks on the Sadr movement's militia. The US and Iraqi Sunnis have accused the Mahdi Army of murdering thousands of Sunnis solely on the basis of their religious beliefs. At the same time, a new front is opening in Basra. In the southern Iraqi oil city, a serious power struggle has broken out between the various Shiite parties, in which the alliances are not entirely clear. The only thing that is certain is that the Fadhila party, which supplies the governor of the city and is steering an independent course in Baghdad as well as Basra, is coming increasingly under pressure. Al-Maliki was selected as prime minister after the parliamentary elections in December 2005 because he seemed to be a centrist. Unlike other members of the Shiite majority, he does not have a particularly close relationship with Tehran. His Dawa party also has fewer armed men than the Sadr movement or the third largest Shiite party, the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). Yet, by now hardly anyone believes that the present government will last much longer. On the one hand, because more than 500 civilians have been murdered or blown up in Baghdad over the past two months despite the new security plan. On the other hand, because the US Democrats are exerting pressure on President George W Bush over the Iraq dilemma, which might finally mean that al-Maliki will have to leave.

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Iraq

Tater's Tots return to Sadr City

2007-03-31

Shi'ite militiamen, who melted away from Baghdad when U.S. and Iraqi troops began their security crackdown seven weeks ago, are rolling back into the city with fresh Iranian training, Iraqi and other officials said. It is not clear whether the radical Shi'ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr is in control of the newly trained group, which some Iraqis describe as a "secret army" trained and equipped by Iran. U.S. forces are concerned that, despite Shi'ite leaders' assurances that they have pulled their fighters off the streets, uncooperative militias will return and seek to destabilize efforts to secure the city. Videotapes and other evidence of Iranian propaganda have been found on people recently detained in Sadr City, said a member of one of the multiple Iraqi and U.S. security forces trying to return security to Baghdad. Sadr City, a sprawling low-income area in northern Baghdad, is the home of Sheik al-Sadr's Mahdi Army militia, the Badr Brigade armed wing of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, followers of the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, several smaller armed Shi'ite factions and criminal gangs. A new element appears to be entering the territory: an extreme Mahdi Army splinter group that broke off from Sheik al-Sadr, went to Iran for training and started to return, said one Iraqi with intimate knowledge of the group. "This is a special group, used for special operations, not controlled by Muqtada al-Sadr. This is a secret army," said the Iraqi, who asked not to be identified for fear of reprisals. "They work for Iranian intelligence. They have good weapons, good salary." The group's objectives are not clear, but the Iraqi said he thought the goal was to exacerbate simmering strife between Sunnis and Shi'ites. The daily number of sectarian executions is creeping up again in some neighborhoods of Baghdad, despite an enormous coordinated security effort by U.S. and Iraqi forces that has reduced incidents of violence. U.S. officers in the field said that clearing Sadr City of violent militiamen is crucial to the overall success of the Baghdad security plan, which began last month and is expected to continue at least through August. "It is the linchpin of the whole plan. Failure in Sadr City equates to an overall failure," said Maj. Wilson "Trey" Rutherford, operations officer for the 2-235 Airborne Infantry Regiment of the 82nd Airborne. A Shi'ite stronghold since the days of Saddam Hussein, Sadr City accounts for roughly two-thirds of the population of Baghdad and about 15 percent of the population of Iraq. Yet it has been a no-go zone for both the Iraqi and U.S. armies for the past two years. Bordered by wealthy neighborhoods of large houses and yards covered by date palms and orange trees, the heart of Sadr City is a jumble of trash, crowded low-rise buildings with corrugated tin doorways and crumbling cement stairways. In the post-Saddam power vacuum, several militias and gangs have spawned in the slum. The challenge of clearing the city of its various militias, many of which are directly linked to the government, is daunting. "We are 120 men and 17 Stryker [armored vehicles] facing 2.9 million people and staring right at the fangs of the beast," said one member of the U.S. forces who faces that challenge daily. U.S. forces have been waiting to enter the heart of Sadr City until they identify the enemies, know their numbers and understand what it will take to subdue them. "We might push something to a flash point and force people to react -- people who, if given another option, might react differently," said one U.S. official, asking not to be named. Instead, U.S. forces are encouraging Iraqi security forces -- some of whom have personal ties to the neighborhood and are followers of Sheik al-Sadr -- to take the lead in the area as they go on joint foot patrols and visit with families on the outskirts of the area. The Iraqi National Police are coordinating with the U.S. in Sadr City with the approval of Sheik al-Sadr, said one U.S. official working in the area to train the police force. "There is a tacit political agreement here, but no one is sure how long it will hold," he said. "There may be elements that are unhappy with the level of cooperation." As long as the cooperation lasts, the Americans are making a huge effort to win over the population by operating free clinics and trying to explain to family after family the goals of the security plan. "When the coalition forces and the Iraqi forces work together in the town, we found the people like that, because they know these forces are there to keep them safe, and that the militia kill people without any reason," said one Iraqi officer. He spoke on the condition of anonymity because he recently survived an assassination attempt.

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Syria-Lebanon-Iran

Missing Iranian general’s family suspects Israel

2007-03-12

The family of Ali Reza Asgari, the Iranian general and former deputy defense minister who disappeared from Turkey last month, snubbed recent newspaper reports claiming he defected to the West and insisted instead that he was kidnapped by foreign agents. His wife Ziba Asgari, 46, contended Western reports that Asgari was a spy and smuggled his family out of Iran prior to his escape. “We are here. Those are mere rumors being spread by the enemies,” she said. His 20-year-old daughter Alham told journalists she was certain Israel or the United States kidnapped him, as they are Iran’s main enemies. “My father worked hard for the regime and he had many enemies due to his position,” she was quoted by Fars, the Iranian news agency. According to the Fars report, Asgari’s wife, two daughters, son and brother arrived at the Turkish embassy in Tehran Monday seeking information on his whereabouts and met with Deputy Ambassador Dorim Ozturk. Asgari’s brother demanded answers from the Turkish representatives, who noted that the matter was being examined and vowed to help as much as they could. “We tried to check for ourselves if there was any new news. We’re very concerned. I really miss my father,” Alham told reporters. Ziba, 46, said the since her husband retired from military positions, he was an olive and olive oil merchant in Syria . She said the family had last been in contact with him in December. On December 7, she said, Asgari traveled from Damascus to Istanbul and checked into a hotel. Two days later, they lost contact with him. “We were in touch with him until Friday, December 8, but on Saturday, we lost contact. His cell phone was turned off and we started to be concerned,” Ziba said. She rejected outright various reports that her husband defected to the West after smuggling his family to a safe place. “He had no problems in Iran that would make him want to escape. Someone seeking refuge takes his family with him,” she said. Unless he's already got himself a sweet young thing.. On Sunday the British newspaper The Sunday Times reported that Asgari had been spying on Iran since 2003 when he was recruited on an overseas business trip. Asgari, 63, was apparently at a NATO base in Germany undergoing a debriefing, the report said. According to the Times, a daring getaway via Damascus was organized by western intelligence agencies after it became clear that his cover was about to be blown. Iran’s notorious secret service, the Vavak, is believed to have suspected that he was a high-level mole, the report said. London-based Asharq al-Awsat newspaper reported Friday that upon his disappearance Asgari was carrying documents and maps that shed light on Iran’s military and the Revolutionary Guards' links to Hizbullah , Islamic Jihad, the “Mahadi Army” and the “Badr Corps” (military forces of The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq). Last week an official American intelligence source told the Washington Post that Israel had orchestrated Asgari’s defection to the West and that he was was cooperating with his questioners and divulging classified information on Iran.

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Syria-Lebanon-Iran

‘Iranian general defected with classified documents’

2007-03-09

Former Iranian Deputy Defense Minister Ali Rez Asgari left Turkey for an undisclosed location in Europe with a false passport with the help of Western officials, the London-based Asharq al-Awsat newspaper reported Friday. A former colleague told the newspaper that Asgari took with him documents and maps that shed light on Iran’s military and the Revolutionary Guards' links to Hizbullah, Islamic Jihad, the “Mahadi Army” and the “Badr Corps” (military forces of The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq). For this, he gets the really good guest house.... The Iranian source said Asgari was also in possession of documents related to Iran’s ballistic missiles project and was privy to confidential information regarding the Islamic Republic’s plan in case of a conflict with the US. ....with 24 hour room service. A senior American official said on Thursday that Asgari is providing Western intelligence agencies with information on Hizbullah and Iran's ties to the organization. Saudi newspaper Al-Watan recently reported the Iranian Revolutionary Guards are instilling changes in the defense systems protecting the country’s nuclear reactors for fear that Israeli and US intelligence agencies are now in possession of specific information that may threaten the facilities. According to Asharq al-Awsat, Asgari informed an American official of his desire to defect a few weeks in advance, after which he was quickly transferred to a safe house in Turkey and given a false passport.

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Iraq

Amara, Iraq and 1929 Chicago, Illinois, USA

2006-10-21

Analysis by Bobby On October 20, the media reported insurgents had taken over police stations in Amara in Iraq, showing the police were no better than two years ago and the insurgents were, shall we say, resurging. End of sound bite. Fact: It was not al-Qaeda, not “insurgents”, not even the usual “sectarian violence”, just a simple gang war for local power. Can’t tell the players without a scorecard: Mahdi Army is Shi'ite - Badr Corps is Shi’ite Mahdi Army is loyal to al-Sadr - Badr Corps is loyal to SCIRI Mahdi Army is nationalist - Badr Corps is trained in Iran Mahdi Army is a militia - Badr Corps controls the police department Mahdi Army dominates the region - Badr Corps control the police department The play: 1. The Madhi Army assassinated a police official, trying to assert their power 2. The police and/or the Badr Corps kidnapped and/or arrested five guys, including a brother of Madi Army bigshot 3. The Mahdi army retaliated by attacking the police/Badr Corps in the police stations 4. News media ‘stringers’ show up, film at 11. 5. Media reports hopeless quagmire 6. Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki sends in the Army, and the violence stops. note that today (10/21), according to the Jerusalem Post, “Iraq's main Sunni Arab party on Saturday strongly backed a fledgling agreement between Sunni and Shi'ite religious figures aimed at ending sectarian bloodletting.” Maybe a positive outcome from yesterday's violence? (A much longer, more detailed discussion of events, which is the basis for the above summary, is reprinted in the footnote below, for those with a longer attention span.) So what’s the point? A little perspective: The St. Valentine's Day massacre is the name given to the shooting of seven people as part of a Prohibition Era conflict between two powerful criminal gangs in Chicago, Illinois in the winter of 1929: the South Side Italian gang led by Al "Scarface" Capone and the North Side Irish/German gang led by George 'Bugs' Moran. On the morning of Thursday, February 14, St. Valentine's Day, seven members of Moran's gang were lined up against the rear inside wall of the garage of the S-M-C Cartage Company in the Lincoln Park neighborhood of Chicago's North Side. They were then shot and killed by five members of Al Capone's gang (two of whom were dressed as police officers). The massacre marked the end of Moran's power on the North Side, and his gang vanished into obscurity, enabling Capone to take over the area; however, the event also brought the belated and full attention of the federal government to Capone and his criminal activities. This was ultimately Capone's downfall, for it led to his conviction and imprisonment on the Volstead Act and income tax evasion charges in 1931. Did the press say the Chicago police were no good, and that the City of Chicago was hopeless and should be abandoned to the gangsters? I imagine some folks thought that. Did the press call for a new President of the United States because of a gang war in Chicago? I doubt it, although President Calvin Coolidge, Jr. was replaced by Herbert Hoover less than three weeks after the Massacre – on March 4, 1929. It was Inauguration Day; Hoover had been elected President in November, 1928. Again, you ask: What’s the point? The press is reporting inaccurately (see the footnote) and does not give any background. The press thinks every story is about the failure of something and is not interested in anything more complex, especially on the evening news. Saddam controlled this sort of activity by crushing one or both sides. Remember he drained thousands of square miles of marsh to punish the “Marsh Arabs”. Even such an enormous environmental catastrophe as that was not well reported. I read about it in Civil Engineering Magazine, in an article written by an Iraqi civil engineer who fled the country in 1991. There were no doubt other atrocities that were not reported at all, in this country. With Saddam in the slammer, Pandora’s Box has been opened, just like in Yugoslavia after strongman Tito died. The violence in Iraq pales compared to the genocide in Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia, and there are still thousands of NATO troops in the region. The point: The war in Iraq is not lost just because the press only reports failures. A bit of balance: The US State Department reports weekly to Congress on the war. (See the whole report at - http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/74934.pdf Earlier weeks are available, too.) This week they reported a total of 312,000 Iraqi police and army have been trained and equipped. The Iraqi Army has taken total control of Ramadi, the so-called “Hotbed of the Insurgency”. The “insurgents’ tested them a few days later with a complex, three-pronged attack. The Army repelled the attack with no losses. The average Baghdad resident gets 6 hours of electricity a day; for the rest of the country, it is 12 hours a day – not good, but better than last year. Oil production hovers quite close to the Iraqi Ministry’s goal of 2.5 million barrels a day, and Iraq is exporting about half that. The real point: Slanted, short-sighted, stupid press coverage really makes me angry. Footnote: From the leftist Juan Cole: “..Amara is the capital of Maysan province (pop. 770,000). Maysan province in general and Amara in particular support the nationalist Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr. Maysan and its capital are among the places to which the Marsh Arabs were displaced when their swamps were dried up by Saddam in retribution for the uprising in 1991, and they are often desperately poor and very tribal, and they seem to have joined the Sadr Movement en masse during the past 3 years. When the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) controlled the Interior Ministry in 2005 and until May, 2006, it used the ministry's national oversight of local police forces to infiltrate members of SCIRI's paramilitary, the Badr Corps, into the Amara police force. There is a bubbling low-level feud between the Sadrists in Maysan and the SCIRI police. So recently the Mahdi Army assassinated Qasim al-Tamimi, a police official who was also a member of the Badr Corps. The Badr Corps was formed in Iran and trained by the Revolutionary Guards, and is viewed by many in the Iraqi-nationalist Mahdi Army as the tool of a foreign power. Then the police arrested or abducted (when militia are in police, how could you tell?) 5 men, including the brother of a Mahdi Army leader in Amara. Then protests escalated into fighting, and the Mahdi Army took over several police stations and killed or wounded dozens of police/ Badr Corps militiamen. The Western press is mostly reporting this story backwards, as a pro-Iranian Sadr Movement taking over Amara. In fact, the Sadr Movement already dominated Amara politically, but the (Iranian-trained) Badr Corps had this unnatural niche in the police. It was Badr that had "taken over" the security forces in a largely Sadrist city. The Mahdi Army was attempting to align local politics with local power. Muqtada al-Sadr, the young spiritual leader of the Sadr Movement and the Mahdi Army, demanded that his men stop fighting and said that he washed his hands of anyone who disobeyed his orders, according to Aljazeera.

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Iraq

New law puts Iraq on verge of split

2006-09-08

THE future of Iraq as a nation has been thrown into jeopardy after a law was introduced to Parliament that would enable the break-up of the country into semi-autonomous regions. If passed, a self-ruling Shiite state is likely to emerge in the south, based on the autonomous region Kurds have already established in the north. It would not only be able to levy its own taxes and govern itself but, Shiite politicians say, would have its own armed guards posted along its borders. Iraq's Sunni community, which is bitterly opposed to the prospect, has warned it will mark the first step in the break-up of the country and could lead to the south of Iraq becoming a satellite of Iran. The Parliament's Speaker said that delegates must compromise and find agreement on the prospect of federalism, otherwise the country risked not only collapsing but descending into anarchy. "We have three to four months to reconcile with each other," said Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, a Sunni. "If the country does not survive this, it will go under." The law is almost certain to pass as federalism is supported by both Shiite and Kurd parties, who control two-thirds of the seats in parliament, though it could be amended. The document was being considered on Wednesday by a committee of senior parliamentarians and its contents, including the powers of the new semi-autonomous regions, remained unclear. Hamid Mualla al-Saadi, a leading member of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the party that drafted the proposal and has historic links to Iran, said only that it would "define how the regions are formed". This would be done through either a vote in a governing council selected from the region's leaders or via a popular referendum, he said.

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Iraq

Sadr modeling Mahdi Army on Hezbollah

2006-05-08

Firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr is working behind the scenes to maintain his armed militant wing and portray it as a social movement, a step that would make him one of Iraq's most powerful figures if it succeeds, U.S. officials and Iraqi politicians say. American officials think that al-Sadr, who already controls the largest bloc of votes in the National Assembly, is modeling himself after Lebanon's Hezbollah, the Iranian-backed Shiite Muslim movement born during that country's civil war in the 1980s. Although it began largely as an armed group, it eventually became a powerful political force with a large social-service component. Some U.S. and Iraq officials think that al-Sadr's shift is a symptom of a growing rift within the powerful Shiite United Iraqi Alliance, which has dominated Iraq's two parliamentary elections. That split pits al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army militia against members of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq to be the voice of all Iraqi Shiites. "It's a struggle for power," said Adnan Pachachi, a secularist and member of parliament. A successful move by al-Sadr would be a major transformation for the 30-something scion of a clan of revered Shiite religious figures. Once derided as ill-educated and undisciplined, al-Sadr has been on the verge of defeat twice at the hands of the American military and once was charged by an Iraqi court with murdering two prominent Shiite clerics. But he's maintained his role in Iraq, joining the United Iraqi Alliance while maintaining his Mahdi Army, which controls Sadr City, Baghdad's largest Shiite neighborhood, named for al-Sadr's father. Now al-Sadr is working to expand his influence, building regional offices in major Shiite communities to help widows, workers, children and the sick with services the Iraqi government can't yet provide, such as health care and potable water. Al-Sadr also is insisting in talks to form a new government that his followers, who hold 32 of the assembly's 275 seats, lead key service ministries such as education and health. Sheik Yousif al-Nasseri, an al-Sadr supporter and the head of al-Shaheedin, an al-Sadr-oriented research center, embraced the comparison between al-Sadr's movement and Lebanon's Hezbollah, particularly if it means that the populace sees al-Sadr as representing the people. The State Department lists Hezbollah as among the Middle East's "active extremist and terrorist groups." American officials also take a dim view of al-Sadr, whom they hold chiefly responsible for attacks on Sunni Muslim mosques after the Feb. 22 bombing of the Askariya shrine, a Shiite holy site, in the mostly Sunni city of Samarra. In the aftermath of those attacks, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad said militias were a greater threat to Iraq than the country's Sunni insurgency. Not everyone thinks al-Sadr will be successful. They note that in contrast to Hezbollah's leader, Sheik Hassan Nasralla, who's considered one of the most charismatic figures in the Middle East, al-Sadr often appears awkward and indecisive in his public appearances. But they agree there's a vacuum for someone to fill, because the government is weak and residents are frustrated by the religious and ethnic discord and the lack of services.

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Iraq

Former CPA advisor sez militias need to go

2006-05-02

While the formation of a new Iraqi government is one necessary condition to avert a civil war there, another is for the US and Iraqi governments to get control of the Shiite militias that American forces have been reluctant to fight. American commanders have said that if a Sunni-Shiite civil war erupts in Iraq, they will look to Iraqi security forces to deal with it. Unfortunately, Iraqi security forces have become increasingly Shiite and, in the case of the police, infiltrated by Shiite militias. As a result, the US position is tantamount to letting the Iraqis slug it out. That raises a question about the point of keeping a large US force in Iraq. But the alternative of putting American troops in the middle of a civil war would be even worse. This predicament stems from two mistakes made after the Iraqis assumed sovereignty from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in 2004. First, the American and Iraqi governments failed to implement the ban on militias negotiated by the CPA and enacted as Iraqi law - even though all militias except the Mahdi Army of the renegade Shiite Muqtada al Sadr agreed to the ban. Second, the Ministry of Interior, which controls Iraq's police, was allowed to fall into the hands of another Shiite militia, the Badr Corps. Even as it combats the Sunni insurgency, the US should use whatever clout it has left in Iraq to get control of the Shiite militias. Though a long shot, the only path may be to revive and finally implement the 2004 ban on militias. The terms of that deal are: 1. Provide job training and placement for militia fighters willing to lay down their arms. Many militiamen probably would welcome such an opportunity at a time when jobs are scarce. The US and Iraqi governments should mount a large-scale program to give individuals an alternative to becoming fighters in a civil war and instead train them to do the construction work needed to rebuild Iraq's dilapidated housing and ruined infrastructure. The cost would be trivial compared with the enormous bill of a sectarian war. Europeans and others could be asked to help fund this worthy cause. 2. Permit militia fighters to join Iraq's security forces as individuals, but not in groups with their command chains still intact. This was the original intention. It means that the Ministry of Interior, as well as the Ministry of Defense, must be taken out of the hands of parties and politicians who want their militias to dominate Iraq's security forces. The US and new Iraqi governments now appear determined to place these "power ministries" under capable nonpartisan ministers. 3. Enforce the disbanding of what is left of the militias after individuals enter job training or Iraqi security services. The 2004 law states that any political party retaining a militia - such as the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq that controls the Badr Corps - should be excluded from politics, instead of being rewarded with high office. Beyond that, US and Iraqi forces must be prepared forcibly to disarm any militias that remain active. Because the Iraqi police have already been largely compromised, this means that the Iraqi Army and the US military must act jointly. The alternative is to let Shiite militias flout the law and escalate sectarian violence - just what Sunni extremists such as Al Qaeda leader in Iraq Abu Musab al-Zarqawi want. The more successful the first two measures, the easier it will be to rid Iraq of remaining militias. Conversely, the first two measures will not work without a credible threat to disband the militias. The Kurds also have militias and must also obey the law. But Iraqi law allows most of these fighters to become official forces of the Kurdish Regional Government. Neither the new Iraqi government nor the US can dissolve the militias by itself. This must be done in partnership and as the first order of business. The danger is that the new Iraqi government could be dominated by the very Shiite parties that control militias. However, early signs are that Prime Minister Jawad al-Maliki will not let this happen. Now that Iraqis have created a new government, they and the US may be able to avert civil war if, perhaps only if, they implement and enforce the militia law. If they do not, keeping US troops in Iraq will get harder and harder to defend.

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Iraq

40 76 killed in Iraq mosque attack

2006-04-07

At least 40 people have died in a suicide bombing attack on a Shia mosque in Baghdad, Iraqi police said today. Two suicide bombers blew themselves up at the Buratha mosque in the north of the capital, one inside the building and the other outside, Reuters reported. Sky News said at least 47 people had been killed in the blast. Reports suggested between 35 and 40 people had been wounded in the attack. Rat bastards. The mosque belongs to the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the most powerful party in the country's ruling Shia Alliance. Police Major Falah al-Mohammedawi said at least 30 people had been injured, based on casualty figures from three hospitals. Officials said shrapnel found at the scene suggested the blasts could have been caused by an explosive vest. However, some reports suggested the attack could have been a combination of mortar fire and a stationary bomb. They were dressed like women: The three bombers were wearing suicide vests. One detonated an explosive inside the hallway of the mosque, another at the main entrance and the third outside the site as worshippers were leaving, police said. Police Lt. Col. Falah al-Mohammedawi said the blasts were caused by two suicide attackers wearing black abayas at the Buratha mosque, which is affiliated with the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the main Shiite party. Jalal Eddin al-Sagheer, the preacher at the mosque and one of the country's leading politicians, said there were three assailants. One came through the women's security checkpoint and blew up first, he said. Another raced into the mosque's courtyard while a third came to his office before detonating themselves, said al-Sagheer, who was not injured. He accused Sunni politicians and clerics of waging "a campaign of distortions and lies against the Buratha mosque, claiming that it includes Sunni prisoners and mass graves of Sunnis."

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Syria-Lebanon-Iran

Taheri: Why Give Iran A Say On Iraq?

2006-03-27

Barring a last-minute hitch Iran and the United States are expected to begin talks on what they have both called "measures to benefit the Iraqi people." The euphemism is unlikely to deceive anyone. What Tehran and Washington are really interested in is to find out each other's true intentions in Iraq. There is no doubt that both Iran and the United States have benefited from the demise of the Baathist regime under Saddam Hussein. The US has eliminated an enemy that it had wounded but not killed in 1991, something that Machiavelli had warned against almost five centuries ago. With Iraq likely to have a pluralist regime in which Shiites are a majority, Iran may no longer face a coalition of Sunni Arab regimes determined to challenge it in the region. But while US and Iranian interests in Iraq converge up to a point, the two powers have diametrically opposite visions when it comes to the future of Iraq, indeed of the entire Middle East. The US wants a democratic and pro-West Iraq with a capitalist market-based economy, and open to the new globalization trends. In his better moments President George W. Bush has even spoken of turning Iraq into a model for the entire Arab world, indeed for all Muslim countries. And that, of course, is indirect competition with Iran that claims that its own system is the ideal one for all Muslims. Iran wants an Iraqi regime that adopts at least some aspects of Khomeinism if only to prove that the Islamic republic in Tehran is not a historic anomaly. The Tehran leadership is also concerned that the emergence of a Shiite-dominated democracy next door may well inspire a democratic revolution in Iran as well. With he center of Shiite theological authority clearly shifting to Najaf, Iran's rulers may risk losing the religious card they have played for the past 27 years. The crucial question in regional politics now is whether Iraq, and beyond it the Middle East, will be reshaped the way US wants it or remolded as Iran's Khomeinist leaders have dreamed of since 1979. It is against that background that it is important to know what Iran would actually bring to the table when, and if, the promised talks materialize. Iran has already scored a point simply by being invited by the US for talks. Although Iran did nothing to oust Saddam Hussein, this invitation bestows on it a stature that only a liberating power would normally have. For example, at the end of World War II no one invited Switzerland or Poland, as neighbors of Germany, to discuss its future. Iran has scored yet another point by positioning itself as a power speaking for the Iraqi people. The leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Abdul-Aziz Hakim has helped Iran's maneuver by issuing a verbal "invitation" to enter the talks almost as a protector of the people of Iraq. The fact that Hakim and his party have been supported by Iran for more than a quarter of a century does not diminish the importance of that move. The Iranian strategy is clear from the outset. Foreign Minister Manuchehr Mottaki has said that Iran's chief priority is to discuss the withdrawal of the US-led coalition forces from Iraq. Mottaki knows that the US and its allies are in Iraq under a United Nations' mandate that will run out in December. He also knows that that mandate cannot be renewed without the consent of the newly elected Iraqi Parliament and government. Finally, he also knows that President George W. Bush is under pressure from both Democrats and Republicans to bring the Iraqi episode to an end. So, when the Americans and their allies start to leave, as they are certain to do later this year, Iran would be able to pretend that it was its efforts that ended the "occupation". Iran, however, has more important ambitions in Iraq. Strategically, it sees post-Saddam Iraq as a corridor through which it can communicate with Syria and Lebanon that it considers as part of its broader glacis. In fact, once Tehran's influence is established in Iraq as it is in Syria and Lebanon, Iran would be able to project power in the Levant for the first time since the early 7th century when the Persian Empire under Khosrow Parviz drove the Byzantines out of Mesopotamia and what is now Syria. It is no accident that scholars in Tehran have just rediscovered the set of agreements that Iran had signed with the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century. Known as the Erzerum treaties, these documents give Iran a droit de regard (the right of oversight) over Iraq's principal Shiite centers of Najaf, Kerbala and Kazemayn (now a suburb of Baghdad). The agreements also enable Iran to take "appropriate action", a code word for military intervention, if it felt that its security, or the access of Iranian pilgrims to "holy places", was being threatened by the presence of foreign hostile forces in southern Iraq. If implemented those agreements could lead to the emergence of an Iranian administration in the "holy cities" and an Iranian veto on key aspects of Iraq's foreign policy. Iran has already used those agreements to persuade the new Iraqi government to sign an agreement under which more than 600,000 Iranian pilgrims would be able to visit Iraq each year with little control from the Iraqi authorities. The second set of documents that Tehran is now dusting up is known as the Algiers Accords, negotiated and signed in Algiers, Geneva, Tehran and Baghdad between 1975 and 1976. These give Iran and Iraq shared sovereignty over the Shatt Al-Arab estuary that constitutes Iraq's principal outlet to the open seas. The agreements, signed by Saddam Hussein as a tactical ploy to end Iranian support for the Kurds in the 1970s, would, if fully implemented, give Iran a chokehold on Iraq's foreign trade, including oil exports. Iran does not want the US to fail in Iraq. It wants the US to succeed in eliminating all possibility of a new Sunni-dominated regime being installed in Baghdad. But Iran wants the US to succeed at the highest possible cost, both in blood and treasure. It is a mystery why Washington wants to give Tehran a place at the high table in Iraq. It is certain that the Islamic republic will continue doing whatever it can to make life difficult for the US-led coalition. The supply of new and more lethal explosives, smuggled into Iraq from Iran, partly via Syria is unlikely to dry up. Nor is Tehran likely to end the training programs launched by its Lebanese Hezbollah clients for Iraqi militants. The decision to involve Iran in Iraqi affairs is likely to anger the United States regional allies who have never discounted the possibility of an Irano-American deal that might leave them in the lurch. The Arab states will also be concerned about the possibility of Iraq's Arab identity being diluted as a result of Iranian intervention. The US may have made this strange move because of the experiment in Afghanistan where talks with Iran did help speed up the defeat of the Taleban and the creation of a new regime in Kabul. But Iraq is not Afghanistan if only because it offers far more scope for Iranian mischief making. The invitation to Iraq is also likely to encourage Iran in its defiance of the United Nations on the nuclear issue. After all if Iran is treated as a major power in one domain it cannot be "bullied" as a weakling in another. Has the Bush administration made its first major mistake with regard to Iraq? It is too early to tell. But this decision may be even worse than a mistake; it may be unnecessary. And, as Talleyrand noted almost 200 years ago, in politics doing something that is not necessary is worse than making a mistake.

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Iraq

Iraq admits death squads operated inside interior ministry

2006-03-13

Senior Iraqi officials Sunday confirmed for the first time that death squads composed of government employees had operated illegally from inside two government ministries. "The deaths squads that we have captured are in the defense and interior ministries," Minister of Interior Bayan Jabr said during a joint news conference with the Minister of Defense. "There are people who have infiltrated the army and the interior." Also, Sunday, a series of deadly attacks hit the Shiite Baghdad neighborhood of Sadr City, which had recently been relatively safe, initiating another round of sectarian killings and threatening to provoke more. Seven car bombs were left in markets around the poor Shiite area. Two exploded at 5:30 p.m., another at 5:35 p.m., two at 5:40 p.m. in a different market, and one at 5:45 p.m. Police found and defused the seventh. The blasts, set off at the busiest time of the day just after poor residents would have returned from their jobs, yet before curfew, killed 46 people and wounded another 204. By Sunday night, the suburb of 2.5 million had been sealed off by police and the private militia of radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, the Mahdi Army. The targeting of Sadr City could provoke a strong political backlash. Sadr City is a bastion of support for al-Sadr, a key backer of Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari's bid for re-election. Al-Jaafari's nomination is strongly opposed by Sunni and Kurdish leaders, although he is supported by United Iraqi Alliance, the Shiite political bloc that is the largest in parliament. The Mahdi Army was also extremely active in attacks on Sunni mosques in the aftermath of last month's bombing of a key Shiite shrine in Samarra that touched off a wave of sectarian killings. Elsewhere around Baghdad, a series of roadside bombs and gun attacks killed another 17 people. Interior Minister Jabr said that investigations into death squads were still ongoing in the Defense Ministry. He said the Interior Ministry had arrested 22 people, and subsequently released 18 as innocent after interrogation, detaining four for further questioning. "Now we have sent them (the four) to the court because it hasn't been proven that all four were involved," Jabr said. "Although I did not have clear signs (of their guilt) I sent them to the justice ministry so that the law could be carried out." Although Jabr appeared to confirm the existence of death squads, the scale of the operation uncovered would appear to be far smaller than critics had alleged. Sunni Muslims have long complained about Shiite death squads that arrived wearing official uniforms and rode in official-looking vehicles to haul away victims. Knight Ridder first reported the accusation of death squads in February last year, and in June documented many cases in which victims were taken away allegedly by men wearing Interior Ministry commando uniforms were later found handcuffed and executed with a bullet to the back of the head. The government had long denied the existence of such death squads. Sunnis had accused the Badr Organization, a Shiite militia supported by Iran, of being behind the killings, inside or outside of government ministries. Jabr is a senior leader of the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, a leading Shiite political party, and has close ties to the Badr Organization. The investigation that led to Sunday's confirmation of government death squads came after American forces stopped a group of men who were passing through a checkpoint in late January. The men wore official uniforms and said they were preparing to execute a Sunni man in their custody. The atmosphere of chaos in Iraq has been stoked in part by the failure of politicians to form a new government nearly three months after national elections. A spokesman for President Jalal Talabani said Iraq's political parties would meet Tuesday to resolve differences and would convene the first parliamentary session Thursday, three days ahead of what had been planned. At the Saddam Hussein trial, where he is accused of having 148 people from Dujail slaughtered in 1982 after a failed assassination attempt, three of his fellow defendants took the witness stand, although they said little and denied their involvement in the killings. Two cited faulty eyesight as the reason spoken testimony differed from earlier signed statements. The trial is expected to progress through the week and culminate with the prosecution examination of Saddam. After proceedings, the prosecutor said, "Anyone convicted of these crimes could be executed within 30 days."

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