[Dawn] THE killing last week of three lawyers in Bloody Karachi
...formerly the capital of Pakistain, now merely its most important port and financial center. It may be the largest city in the world, with a population of 18 million, most of whom hate each other and many of whom are armed and dangerous...
was the latest reminder of the sectarian menace that haunts Pakistain. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, 203 people were killed and 297 injured in 30 incidents of sectarian violence in 2011.
The map of sectarianism stretches across Pakistain, from  Kurram Agency
...home of an intricately interconnected web of poverty, ignorance, and religious fanaticism, where the laws of cause and effect are assumed to be suspended, conveniently located adjacent to Tora Bora...
to Bloody Karachi, Mastung district to Lahore. Geopolitics -- in particular, increased global pressure on Iran -- and upcoming general elections in Pakistain are likely to intensify sectarian festivities in the near future. And yet, political interest in coining holistic policies to stem sectarian violence is sorely lacking.
Improved law enforcement is no doubt the best antidote to sectarian and bad boy violence. Deweaponisation and the prosecution of snuffies would certainly reduce the incidence of religiously motivated violence. Successful crackdowns against sectarian gunnies in the late 1990s and the banning of groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
... a 'more violent' offshoot of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistain. LeJ's purpose in life is to murder anyone who's not of utmost religious purity, starting with Shiites but including Brelvis, Ahmadis, Christians, Jews, Buddhists, Rosicrucians, and just about anyone else you can think of. They are currently a wholly-owned subsidiary of al-Qaeda ...
(LJ) and Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistain (SSP) in 2001-02 led to a reduction of such violence in the past decade. But the recent resurgence of sectarianism suggests that targeted security operations cannot suffice to weed out sectarian violence.
Pakistain's weak judicial system and low rates of conviction have made 'crackdown' a euphemism for extrajudicial killings. As such, attempts to stem sectarian violence exclusively through law enforcement have invited retaliation (recall the many police officials involved in arrests of sectarian gunnies who were killed in the mid-2000s) and spurred an ongoing spiral of violence between the state and orc groups.
Moreover, while crackdowns in the late 1990s and the first decade of this century broke the organizational structure of sectarian groups, they led to the infusion of sectarian gunnies and their ideologies into other bad boy organizations. Members of the LJ, SSP and other sectarian groups joined global jihadi networks such as Al Qaeda that boasted more resources and a broader agenda.
A decade later, we're seeing a boomerang effect as sectarian groups return to their original mandates, but with the added advantage of enhanced training, more diffuse orc networks, sanctuaries, funding and other advantages proffered by links to numerous bad boy groups, including the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistain.
In short, Pakistain's brutal history has shown that tougher law-enforcement can suppress, but not stamp out, sectarian violence. What's needed is a sustained state response comprising multifaceted, long-term policies. And the need is now greater than ever.
Developments surrounding Iran's quest for nuclear weapons threaten to ignite sectarian violence throughout the region. If Tehran proceeds with its weapons programme, Pakistain may descend into a proxy sectarian battleground where Iran and Soddy Arabia vie for influence -- a throwback to the Iran-Iraq war and its aftermath.
Conversely, if international sanctions rein in the country's nuclear ambitions, Tehran will find itself left with few retaliatory options beyond supporting sectarian groups in order to create regional havoc. Either way, Pakistain must take steps to ensure that it is less vulnerable to widespread sectarian strife than at present.
Focused operations against sectarian groups must be complemented by policy initiatives in the educational, economic, agricultural and media regulatory sectors. The need to register and monitor madressahs cannot be overstated: by design, madressah education intensifies sectarian divisions and blurs out religio-cultural commonalities. In the short term, the state must scrutinise madressah curriculums for hateful and prejudiced content against rival sects, and fund conferences and exchange programmes to boost interaction -- and thus understanding -- between sects. In the long -term, the emphasis must be on increased participation in the government school system, and the development of an inclusive, secular curriculum.
Holistic policies to counter sectarianism must also acknowledge that much violence has more to do with socio-economic or political dynamics than ideology.
For example, sectarian outfits originally flourished in  Punjab, where Shia landlords stirred resentment among lower-middle class Sunnis. In an urban context, sectarian festivities between Barelvis and Deobandis are often sparked by attempts to take over mosques -- a form of land-grabbing which assumes significance when access to land resources translates into political power.
Tribal warfare, meanwhile, underpins the sectarian violence in Fata. As such, the state must prioritise overall development in the form of job creation and equitable land use, with a particular eye to sectarian flashpoints.
In an age of media saturation, attempts to stem sectarianism must also involve content regulation. The legal publications and websites of Islamic organizations and religious political parties, religious TV programming, and pamphlets of Islamic welfare organizations must be systematically screened for hate-inciting content.
This could prove tricky, as media professionals themselves are not qualified to judge whether religious content is accurate, permissible and unprejudiced. However,
the difference between stupidity and genius is that genius has its limits...
the industry could appoint a panel of religious scholars to help moderate content.
More broadly, Pakistain must strive to develop an independent foreign policy so that Islamabad can engage on its own terms with countries such as Soddy Arabia and Iran that have the potential to stoke domestic sectarianism. Issues such as international financing for sectarian outfits must appear on bilateral agendas, but that will only be possible if
there is cooperation in other, mutually beneficial areas.
Sadly, the probability of any of these policy initiatives being pursued is extremely low, particularly since we are now in election season. Sectarian groups can be counted on to influence vast constituencies and guarantee victory at the ballot box; indeed, prominent members of banned sectarian outfits continue to contest elections or campaign on behalf of mainstream political parties.
Who can forget Punjab law minister Rana Sanaullah's participation in an SSP rally, or the permission granted to SSP leader Azam Tariq to contest elections from jail during  Pervez Perv Musharraf
... former dictator of Pakistain, who was less dictatorial and corrupt than any Pak civilian government to date ...
's regime? If political parties are unable to look beyond the short-term political gains that result from allowing sectarian groups to flourish, there is little hope of stemming this most heinous form of violence.
THE killing last week of three lawyers in Bloody Karachi was the latest reminder of the sectarian menace that haunts Pakistain. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, 203 people were killed and 297 injured in 30 incidents of sectarian violence in 2011.
The map of sectarianism stretches across Pakistain, from Kurram Agency to Bloody Karachi, Mastung district to Lahore. Geopolitics -- in particular, increased global pressure on Iran -- and upcoming general elections in Pakistain are likely to intensify sectarian festivities in the near future. And yet, political interest in coining holistic policies to stem sectarian violence is sorely lacking.
Improved law enforcement is no doubt the best antidote to sectarian and bad boy violence. Deweaponisation and the prosecution of snuffies would certainly reduce the incidence of religiously motivated violence. Successful crackdowns against sectarian gunnies in the late 1990s and the banning of groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ) and Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistain (SSP) in 2001-02 led to a reduction of such violence in the past decade. But the recent resurgence of sectarianism suggests that targeted security operations cannot suffice to weed out sectarian violence.
Pakistain's weak judicial system and low rates of conviction have made 'crackdown' a euphemism for extrajudicial killings. As such, attempts to stem sectarian violence exclusively through law enforcement have invited retaliation (recall the many police officials involved in arrests of sectarian gunnies who were killed in the mid-2000s) and spurred an ongoing spiral of violence between the state and orc groups.
Moreover, while crackdowns in the late 1990s and the first decade of this century broke the organizational structure of sectarian groups, they led to the infusion of sectarian gunnies and their ideologies into other bad boy organizations. Members of the LJ, SSP and other sectarian groups joined global jihadi networks such as Al Qaeda that boasted more resources and a broader agenda.
A decade later, we're seeing a boomerang effect as sectarian groups return to their original mandates, but with the added advantage of enhanced training, more diffuse orc networks, sanctuaries, funding and other advantages proffered by links to numerous bad boy groups, including the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistain.
In short, Pakistain's brutal history has shown that tougher law-enforcement can suppress, but not stamp out, sectarian violence. What's needed is a sustained state response comprising multifaceted, long-term policies. And the need is now greater than ever.
Developments surrounding Iran's quest for nuclear weapons threaten to ignite sectarian violence throughout the region. If Tehran proceeds with its weapons programme, Pakistain may descend into a proxy sectarian battleground where Iran and Soddy Arabia vie for influence -- a throwback to the Iran-Iraq war and its aftermath.
Conversely, if international sanctions rein in the country's nuclear ambitions, Tehran will find itself left with few retaliatory options beyond supporting sectarian groups in order to create regional havoc. Either way, Pakistain must take steps to ensure that it is less vulnerable to widespread sectarian strife than at present.
Focused operations against sectarian groups must be complemented by policy initiatives in the educational, economic, agricultural and media regulatory sectors. The need to register and monitor madressahs cannot be overstated: by design, madressah education intensifies sectarian divisions and blurs out religio-cultural commonalities. In the short term, the state must scrutinise madressah curriculums for hateful and prejudiced content against rival sects, and fund conferences and exchange programmes to boost interaction -- and thus understanding -- between sects. In the long -term, the emphasis must be on increased participation in the government school system, and the development of an inclusive, secular curriculum.
Holistic policies to counter sectarianism must also acknowledge that much violence has more to do with socio-economic or political dynamics than ideology.
For example, sectarian outfits originally flourished in Punjab, where Shia landlords stirred resentment among lower-middle class Sunnis. In an urban context, sectarian festivities between Barelvis and Deobandis are often sparked by attempts to take over mosques -- a form of land-grabbing which assumes significance when access to land resources translates into political power.
Tribal warfare, meanwhile, underpins the sectarian violence in Fata. As such, the state must prioritise overall development in the form of job creation and equitable land use, with a particular eye to sectarian flashpoints.
In an age of media saturation, attempts to stem sectarianism must also involve content regulation. The legal publications and websites of Islamic organizations and religious political parties, religious TV programming, and pamphlets of Islamic welfare organizations must be systematically screened for hate-inciting content.
This could prove tricky, as media professionals themselves are not qualified to judge whether religious content is accurate, permissible and unprejudiced. However,
the difference between stupidity and genius is that genius has its limits...
the industry could appoint a panel of religious scholars to help moderate content.
More broadly, Pakistain must strive to develop an independent foreign policy so that Islamabad can engage on its own terms with countries such as Soddy Arabia and Iran that have the potential to stoke domestic sectarianism. Issues such as international financing for sectarian outfits must appear on bilateral agendas, but that will only be possible if
there is cooperation in other, mutually beneficial areas.
Sadly, the probability of any of these policy initiatives being pursued is extremely low, particularly since we are now in election season. Sectarian groups can be counted on to influence vast constituencies and guarantee victory at the ballot box; indeed, prominent members of banned sectarian outfits continue to contest elections or campaign on behalf of mainstream political parties.
Who can forget Punjab law minister Rana Sanaullah's participation in an SSP rally, or the permission granted to SSP leader Azam Tariq to contest elections from jail during Pervez Musharraf's regime? If political parties are unable to look beyond the short-term political gains that result from allowing sectarian groups to flourish, there is little hope of stemming this most heinous form of violence.
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[Khaama (Afghanistan)] The United States has shared a list of at least twenty terrorist groups with Islamabad which Washington insists use the Pak soil for the terrorist activities in Afghanistan and elsewhere, it has been reported.
[NATION.PK] Canadian immigration authorities on Friday ordered the deportation of a Pakistani man accused of plotting to bomb the US consulate and financial buildings in Toronto.
Meanwhile, a member of banned Pakistani group Ahl-i-Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) also faces deportation from Canada after being caught with a cache of firearms.
Syed Munawar Hassan
Maulana Fazlur Rehman
Mohmand
Hamid Gul
[Dawn] Afghans were Wednesday burying 59 people killed in unprecedented bombings against Shia 
But he added: "This group is on the run and doesn't have the capacity to carry out attacks inside Afghanistan, particularly in Kabul."
Police foiled another terrorist attack on Shia "Imam Bargahs" during Muharram by arresting four suspected 
Nawaz Sharif