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Syria-Lebanon-Iran

First Palmyra. Bride of the Desert. Part 1

2024-03-31

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited. See the link for maps and photos

Text taken from Commissioner Yarrick post

Commentary by Russian military journalist Boris Rozhin is in italics

Posted for preserving the Russian historical perspective of the Syrian Civil War
[CHERNARUSIANNARCOWARS] FIRST PALMYRA. DESERT BRIDE

With a noose around the neck

In 2014, the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, where by that time there was already a long-term military conflict, changed dramatically. By mid-summer 2014, militants from the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) ousted the forces of moderate and radical opposition from Eastern Syria, occupying almost the entire province of Deir ez-Zor. On June 30, 2014, the leader of ISIS militants Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the creation of a “caliphate” - a terrorist quasi-state in the territories of Syria and Iraq with claims to global expansion.

Having no other opponents among competing groups in eastern Syria, ISIS militants (which by that time had changed its name to IS - “Islamic State”, thereby removing the regional link) soon moved on to attacks on Syrian government forces. In August and December 2014, IS gangs attacked the Deir ez-Zor airbase and surrounding areas of the city, blockading the last Syrian army enclave on the banks of the Euphrates. And in parallel with this, IS is making its first forays into Central Syria with the aim of capturing strongholds of the government army.

On July 16, 2014, a small mobile force of 100 experienced IS fighters attacked the Al-Sha'ir gas field northwest of Palmyra. The gas field was defended by about 400 SAA soldiers and National Defense Forces militias, supported by Syrian Air Force aircraft from the nearby Shayrat airbase. After 12 hours of continuous fighting, IS captured eight checkpoints around the field, encircling Syrian army units. Only 30 military personnel managed to escape from the “cauldron”: the 270 people remaining on Al-Shair, including 11 civilian workers, were executed by the militants. Up to 200 more people who found themselves in the “cauldron” remained in captivity or went missing.

Read the rest at this link

PART II
The Path to the East

As we remember from previous articles, in the very first days of the Russian operation in the SAR, together with the air group of the Russian Aerospace Forces and the “Syrian Express”, a group of Russian volunteers and military veterans under the command of Dmitry Utkin (“Wagner”, “Ninth”), which was supposed to support the actions of the Syrian army, as well as ensure the implementation of the most complex and dangerous operations. The first meeting of the “musicians” with Syrian militants was the battles in Northern Latakia in the fall of 2015: it was the fighters of the “orchestra” who were in the vanguard of the Syrian troops clearing the approaches to the Russian Khmeimim airbase. Then, with the direct participation and activity of Russian attack aircraft, the fighters of the Syrian army for the first time managed to show a phenomenal result - move from positional warfare to an offensive, shift the front in the mountainous regions of Latakia and divert any threat from the Russian airbase.

Over the next few months, the fighters of the Wagner Group were transferred to the Palmyra area, where they received a new task. The Orchestra fighters had to begin advancing along the route, while the Syrian army was churning the mud near Mkhin and Khavarin, cutting a road directly to Palmyra - but so far without storming the city itself. Having accepted the task, in parallel with the advance of the Syrian army near Jebel al-Hazm, supported by attacks from Russian cruise missiles, the “musicians” began an assault on the eastern slopes of the Jebel Khayal mountains, captured several points and advanced east towards Palmyra.

As the GRAY ZONE Telegram channel notes, by this time the Wagner Group had been completed with new fighters from the assault squads. The total number of the “Orchestra” in Syria by this time reached almost 2.5 thousand people. Since the Palmyra operation already required specialized military equipment, units of heavy armored vehicles, as well as pickup trucks with installed large-caliber weapons, were transferred to the balance of the Wagner Group through the mediation of the Russian Ministry of Defense. Some equipment was captured from the militants, some weapons were transferred to Russian fighters from Syrian units. As a result, by the winter of 2015/16, the Wagner Group was armed with several infantry fighting vehicles, T-90, T-72 and T-62 tanks, armored vehicles, recoilless rifles, ATGMs, numerous variations of Kalashnikov assault rifles (from Russian manufacturers to low-quality Chinese "Samsungs") and even foreign sniper rifles (in particular, Austrian Steyr-Mannlicher).

Read the rest at this link

Link

Home Front: WoT

Pakistani doctor jailed in US for bid to help IS

2023-08-27

[Dawn] A Pak physician was sentenced on Friday to 18 years in prison for attempting to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization, the turban Islamic State
...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allah around with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not really Moslems....
group.

Court documents showed Mohammad Masood, 31, a licensed medical doctor in Pakistain, was formerly employed as a research coordinator at a clinic in Rochester, Minnesota. Between January and March 2020, he used an encrypted messaging application to facilitate his travel overseas to join a terrorist organization.

A US Justice Department blurb said Mr Masood made multiple statements about his desire to join the turban Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham group, and he pledged his allegiance to the organization and its leader. The doctor also expressed his desire to conduct "lone wolf" terrorist attacks in the United States.

According to the documents submitted in a federal court, Mr Masood on Feb 21, 2020, purchased a plane ticket from reliably Democrat Chicago, aka The Windy City or Mobtown
...home of Al Capone, the Chicago Black Sox, a succession of Daleys, Barak Obama, and Rahm Emmanuel...
, Illinois, to Amman, Jordan, and from there planned to travel to Syria. On March 16, 2020, his travel plans changed because Jordan closed its borders for incoming travellers due to the coronavirus (aka COVID19 or Chinese Plague)

coronavirus (aka COVID19 or Chinese Plague)

...the twenty first century equivalent of bubonic plague, only instead of killing off a third of the population of Europe it kills 3.4 percent of those who notice they have it. It seems to be fond of the elderly, especially Iranian politicians and holy men...
pandemic.

Mr Masood then decided to fly from Minneapolis, Minnesota to Los Angeles to meet up with an individual who he believed would assist him with travel via a fat merchantman to the IS territory.

On March 19, that year Mr Masood travelled from Rochester to Minneapolis-St. Paul International Airport (MSP) to board a flight bound for Los Angeles. Upon arrival at MSP, he was arrested by the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force.

Mr Masood pleaded guilty on Aug 16, 2022, to attempting to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist organization. He was sentenced on Aug 25 before Senior Judge Paul A. Magnuson.

Link

Afghanistan

The Territory of the Jihadists: Who Are the Foreign Fighters of ISIS in Afghanistan?

2023-08-13

[8am] Based on the findings of the Hasht-e Subh Daily, IS-K in Afghanistan has not only recruited local fighters but has also added a significant number of imported muscle to its ranks. Paks have consistently been considered primary leaders of IS-K and currently hold notable roles in the council of the group, which is the decision-making body for IS-K, evaluating and finalizing the leader’s decisions. Despite some Pak IS-K commanders being killed in Afghanistan, certain Paks still operate as nominal leaders in some provinces, including Kunar and Laghman
...Afghan province with a population of about 445,600, which is multi-ethnic and mostly a rural society. During the invasions of Alexander the Great, the area was known as Lampaka, wich is apparently Olde Macedonian for Laghman.The city of Mihtarlam serves as the bucolic capital of the province. The population is half Pashtun, the remainder Tadjik and Pashai. It had a repution for great wealth until it was conquered in the tenth century by Abu Mansur Sabuktigin.

He conquered it and set fire to the places in its vicinity which were inhabited by infidels, and demolishing the idol-temples, he established Islam in them, He marched and captured other cities and killed the polluted wretches, destroying the idolatrous and gratifying the Musulmans. After wounding and killing beyond all measure, his hands and those of his friends became cold in counting the value of the plundered property.

After that it was mostly notable for the production of dirt, rocks, and holy men...
Recently, Uzbek fighters from the Jundallah
..."Soldiers of God," a name used by ~~two~~ multiple separate terror outfits, one active in Iran and the other in Pakistain. Both are Sunni organizations that target Shiites. The Pak version has close relations with al-Qaeda and the Pak Talibs and is probably a false nose and mustache for Lashkar-e-Jhangvi...
group have joined IS-K. After the liquidation of their leader by the Taliban
Taliban

...Arabic for students...
, these Uzbek holy warriors, with around two thousand fighters, pledged allegiance to ISIS and joined its Khorasan branch to seek Dire Revenge against the Taliban.

Meanwhile,
...back at the shootout, Butch clutched at his other shoulder......
ISIS-Khorasan (IS-K) has escalated efforts to attract Pak and Uzbek fighters. The leadership of this branch of ISIS continues to strive towards enlisting dissatisfied Uzbek fighters from the Taliban. Notably, with the presence of these fighters, ISIS activities have expanded across Central Asia, resulting in rocket attacks on other countries.

The ISIS group launched its branch’s activities in Afghanistan and the region under the name "ISIS-Khorasan (IS-K)" for the first time in 2015. The geographical scope envisioned by ISIS for its Khorasan region included parts of Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistain. However,
some people are alive only because it's illegal to kill them...
the activities of this group have expanded since then, extending its attacks to Central Asia. The latest United Nations
...an organization which on balance has done more bad than good, with the good not done well and the bad done thoroughly...
statistics indicate that the ISIS-Khorasan (IS-K) branch currently has between four to six thousand fighters in Afghanistan.

Noted.

Previous reports suggested that considering the geographic scope of ISIS-Khorasan (IS-K), most of its members are Afghan nationals and hold key positions within the group.

However,
some people are alive only because it's illegal to kill them...
findings of the Hasht-e Subh Daily indicate that a significant portion of ISIS-Khorasan (IS-K) is composed of foreign jihadists; individuals who, due to dissatisfaction with other jihadist groups, including the Afghan Taliban and Tahrik-e-Taliban Pakistain (TTP), have pledged allegiance to ISIS. Some members of al-Qaeda also have connections with ISIS, and given the presence of both groups in Afghanistan, it’s possible that they might have dual affiliations.

Why not? The leadership of the Haqqani faction of the Afghan Taliban also have places on the Al Qaeda table of organization.

But the question remains: which specific groups’ fighters are currently part of ISIS-Khorasan (IS-K), and what role do they play in expanding the group’s operational reach?

PAKS: FROM FOUNDING IS-K TO ACTIVE ROLE IN LAJNA COUNCIL
Despite the presence of Afghan fighters within IS-K, the branch was initially founded by dissident Pak Taliban members on Afghan soil. Hafiz Saeed
...founder of Lashkar-e-Taiba and its false-mustache offshoot Jamaat-ud-Dawa. The United Nations declared the JuD a terrorist organization in 2008 and Hafiz Saeed a terrorist as its leader. Hafiz, JuD and LeT are wholly-owned subsidiaries of the Pak intel apparatus, so that amounted to squat. He is periodically placed under house arrest so it looks like the govt is doing something. Once the heat is off they let him go....
Orakzai, a former Pak Taliban commander, pledged allegiance to ISIS in October 2014 due to dissatisfaction with both the Afghan and Pak Taliban. He served as the leader of IS-K for about one and a half years until he was killed by U.S. forces in August 2016. After a year of leadership by Abdul Hasib Pashtun-infested Logari, the leadership of ISIS-Khorasan (IS-K) (IS-K) once again shifted to Pak fighters. At that time, Abdullah Orakzai, also known as Aslam Farooqi, assumed this responsibility in April 2017 until he was eventually detained and imprisoned by authorities of the former government in the year 2020.

Since then, some dissident Pak Taliban fighters have remained part of ISIS-Khorasan (IS-K) and have played crucial roles as commanders in the current IS-K conflict. Even some of the "amirs" or (leaders) of IS-K in Afghanistan are Pak fighters. For example, Qari Faateh, who operated as the nominal amir of IS-K in Kunar province
... which is right down the road from Chitral. Kunar is Haqqani country.....
, was announced to have been killed by the Taliban in Kabul in February of this year. At that time, Zabihullah Mujahid, the Taliban front man, stated that Qari Faateh was the head of intelligence and operations for IS-K, and the Taliban accused him of orchestrating attacks on mosques and diplomatic sites.

Continuing, in early June of this year, the Taliban announced the killing of an ISIS commander named Tarab Bajauri in the province of Laghman. This Pak commander was operating as the "amir" (leader) of the IS-K branch in Laghman province and was considered one of the individuals who joined ISIS alongside Hafiz Saeed Orakzai. Bajauri had a long military background and was among those responsible for ISIS’s significant influence in Kunar province. The Taliban regarded him as a key member of the ISIS-Khorasan (IS-K) in Afghanistan. Such stances by the Taliban indicate that Pak fighters are significant pillars of IS-K and actively operate within Afghanistan under Taliban control.

Currently, Asadullah Orakzai is another prominent Pak commander of ISIS-Khorasan (IS-K). He operates as the amir of ISIS in Laghman province and is also a member of the Lajna Council. According to the Hasht-e Subh Daily’s findings, this council holds the leadership responsibility for ISIS-Khorasan (IS-K) and decides on the group’s activities in the "Khorasan region." Most of the IS-K commanders, especially the Pak ones who are currently active members of ISIS, are actively involved in the Lajna Council. Qari Faateh, who was also a member of this council, participated in making decisions for the future of IS-K. Additionally, Saifullah Orakzai, another prominent commander of IS-K, is a member of this council.

In this way, the findings indicate that Pak fighters are active members of the ISIS-Khorasan (IS-K) operating in Afghanistan. They have experience in leading the ISIS-Khorasan (IS-K) on two occasions and are currently serving as commanders in provinces as well as engaging in military and intelligence activities.

According to additional information, ISIS-Khorasan (IS-K) is vigorously striving to increase its Pak fighters. This branch of ISIS has included the issue of recruiting Pak fighters as part of its future plans. In this process, individuals dissatisfied with their activities alongside the Tahrik-e-Taliban Pakistain (TTP) are being targeted for recruitment by ISIS to expand its activities in eastern Afghanistan and certain areas of Pakistain. It’s noteworthy that most Pak members of the ISIS-Khorasan (IS-K) have joined the group due to dissatisfaction with their previous affiliations, and given the extent of this dissatisfaction, the increase in the number of Pak fighters for ISIS is probable.

JUNDALLAH UZBEK JIHADISTS AND THEIR INVOLVEMENT WITH IS-K
The findings indicate that members of the Uzbek group Jundallah have also joined IS-Khorasan (IS-K) in the northern regions of Afghanistan. According to the information, currently, except for a small fraction of the group, most of the Uzbek commanders and fighters have become part of IS-Khorasan (IS-K). ISIS has incorporated a segment of the Jundallah group, consisting of Uzbek fighters in northern Afghanistan, into its ranks. Consequently, Mullah Saad, an Uzbek national, has assumed leadership of this group within IS-Khorasan (IS-K), and Uzbek holy warrior Osama Ghazi serves as his deputy. In addition to these two leaders from the Jundallah group, around two thousand fighters from this group and thousands of their supporters in Takhar, Kunduz, Badakhshan, and Faryab provinces have also become part of IS-Khorasan (IS-K).

This significant shift occurred as Uzbek fighters in Jundallah grew disillusioned with the Taliban regime. According to the Hasht-e Subh Daily’s findings, the Uzbek holy warriors played a major role in the Taliban’s takeover in the north of Afghanistan. However,
some people are alive only because it's illegal to kill them...
following the Taliban’s return, Jundallah’s leadership and members faced hostility from them. The Taliban resorted to assassinations of some Jundallah leaders to control the group. Notably, Uzbek migrant Osman Ghazi, who entered Afghanistan with five thousand of his Uzbek followers during Baranuddin Rabbani’s rule, later joined Jundallah at the request of Abdul Malik Rigi, a Jundallah member. Rigi, who operated in Iran, was executed after being arrested by the Islamic Theocratic Republic of Iran.

After the first fall of the Taliban regime, Ghazi went to Pakistain to lead his group’s terrorist attacks alongside the Afghan Taliban against the previous government. Following orders from Mullah Mohammed Omar, the founder of the Taliban, Ghazi returned with hundreds of his followers to the province of Zabul and, in 2016, made an informal allegiance to ISIS during a consultation with some Taliban leaders. This move seemingly served as part of the plan to eliminate him, as shortly after, Ghazi became the target of an ambush by Taliban commanders and was killed in Zabul province along with his wife and several children.

Based on the findings of the Hasht-e Subh Daily, this action led Osama Ghazi, his son, and 150 other Jundallah members from Zabul province, where his father was present, to go to the provinces of Kandahar and Badakhshan and then leave those areas too. However,
some people are alive only because it's illegal to kill them...
he waited for Dire Revenge from the Taliban until, following the Taliban’s resurgence, he and all members of his group joined ISIS. It should be noted that ISIS has utilized Jundallah members in expanding its activities in Central Asia. For instance, a member of this group, who previously operated under Salahuddin Ayubi’s command in Faryab province, launched a rocket attack on the soil of Uzbekistan.

On the other hand, IS-K’s efforts to gain the allegiance of Salahuddin Ayubi, a commander of Uzbek origin and dissatisfied with the Taliban, have intensified. He has close relations with the northern hard boyz and appears to be able to establish connections with other gangs in Tajikistan and other northern regions of the country. Moreover, ISIS, pursuing its plans for expanding activities in Central Asia, seeks to establish further communication with Uzbekistan fighters. This endeavor highlights the group’s intention to engage with some commanders and fighters of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

Meanwhile,
...back at the shootout, Butch clutched at his other shoulder......
based on available information, ISIS has previously designated a commander for Tajikistan as well. It is worth recalling that, in addition to Khorasan, the group is also seriously focused on the Indian subcontinent. According to the findings, in mid-2022, the leadership of ISIS instructed its members in the "Province of Hind" to intensify their activities in India and Pakistain. Abu al-Hasan al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, the then-leader of ISIS in Iraq and Syria, had urged Sheikh Zubair Ahmed, the ISIS governor in India, to bring about positive changes in that geography. Subsequently, Sheikh Zubair Ahmed decided to activate his media unit and conduct activities through Telegram, following the same directive.

The Islamic State
...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allah around with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not really Moslems....
of Iraq and Syria, known as ISIS, was originally formed in the late 20th century under the name "Jamāʿat al-Tawḥīd wal-Jihād." It merged with al-Qaeda in 2004 but adopted the name "Islamic State of Iraq and Syria" in 2013. In 2014, ISIS declared a caliphate, with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its first recognized leader. Currently, besides Iraq and some Arab countries, ISIS also operates extensively in Afghanistan. These activities have intensified after the return of the Taliban to power, and they encompass attacks on diplomatic sites and rocket attacks on countries in Central Asia. With recent changes in ISIS and the joining of imported muscle to its Khorasan branch, it appears that the group has significant plans for further infiltration into the "Wilayah of Khorasan." Previously, information indicated that IS-K was seeking to seize control of Kunar Province
...one of the four N2KL provinces (Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar and Laghman). N2KL is the designation used by US and Coalition Forces for the rugged and very violent region opposite Pakistain's Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Northwest Frontier Province. Kunar is the center of the N2KL region. Its population is 95% Pashtun. It is adjacent to Bajaur Agency..
, a move that has been delayed after the assessment by its Lajna Council.

Link

Terror Networks

Islamic State Just Changed its Form In Syria

2023-07-31

[NPASYRIA] ISIS caliphate once had a population of 10 million people within its borders. It stretched across two countries Iraq and Syria contained major towns and cities, oil fields, factories and dams and was roughly the size of Britannia. While tactically and strategically, ISIS is a mere shadow of what it was, but it still remains a potent force. There is a growing perception among the Western analysts that Islamic State

...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allah around with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not really Moslems....
doesn’t pose any significant threat. While the physical caliphate has extinguished but the bad boy group still has thousands of fighters in its ranks in Syria. Since the fall of Raqqa the former de facto capital of the self-proclaimed ISIS caliphate. The group adopted the calculated strategy of withdrawing to conserve manpower and pivot away from holding territory to pursuing an all-out insurgency in the near future. The IS has returned to its roots, conducting an insurgency the same way it did in Iraq in the early 2000s. It’s using small groups of well-armed gunnies driving around on cycle of violences or in pickup trucks with machine guns. In some cases, they may have some heavy weaponry, but mostly they are just doing hit and run attacks all the time. Sometimes, it’s just shooting from far away at military patrols to scare them away or keep them from patrolling in certain areas.

Despite the end of its territorial caliphate in 2019 and the death of several of its leaders since, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria has demonstrated considerable resilience. It continues to operate as a highly active insurgency, particularly in the countryside of Syria. Also the group’s top leadership still operates from the Syrian territory. It is evident from the fact that all three caliphs were killed in operations within Syria and were believed to have been moving between the borders of Syria and ~~The Sick Man of Europe~~ Turkey

Link

Syria-Lebanon-Iran

Washington opens a terrorist second front against Russia

2023-05-27

Direct Translation via Google Translate. Edited.

by Kirill Semenov

One of the leaders of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) terrorist group, which holds the Syrian Idlib, Abu Maria al-Qahtani , said that the HTS intends to focus on confrontation with Iran, and hence Russia, which act as allies Syrian government. This became known on May 24, when a translation of al-Qahtani's article was published.

The Hayat Tahrir al-Sham group actually emerged in 2012 as the Jabhat al-Nusra group, which was a branch of the Islamic State of Iraq terrorist organization. After ISIS declared itself the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) in 2013, Jabhat al-Nusra refused to swear allegiance to it and came under the auspices of al-Qaeda. In 2017, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was created, which announced the severance of all ties with al-Qaeda and became a rival group led by Abu Muhammad al-Julani.

The call to move away from the course of the fight against the United States and move on to confrontation with Iran, voiced by the leaders of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, was apparently made under the influence of Washington. The United States has long been sending HTS signals through publications by recognized experts and think tanks about the possible removal of this terrorist organization from the relevant lists if it meets a number of conditions.

It is obvious that Washington is waiting for the HTS to abandon hostility towards the United States and reorient itself to the fight against the opponents of the United States, and at the same time to include Al-Qaeda branches in this process - their HTS will have to lead. Thus, the Americans can not only eliminate the threat from the unruly al-Qaeda, which must be disbanded, but also direct its branches to subvert US rivals such as Iran and Russia.

In particular, Abu Maria al-Qahtani criticizes the appointment of Saif al-Adl as the new head of al-Qaeda instead of the murdered Ayman al-Zawahiri . He points out that he is al-Adl in Iran, and therefore it is not clear to him how he will lead the organization, being under the control of the local authorities and the IRGC. Therefore, Abu Maria calls on all branches and branches of Al-Qaedato withdraw from this organization, and Al-Qaeda itself to disband in order to oppose Iran as a “united front”.

In fact, HTS intends to lead the front of jihadist groups against Iran and Russia, replacing in this role the "central apparatus" of Al-Qaeda as the main coordinating body.

"Roadmap" of the legalization of terrorists
Back in 2021, the International Crisis Group, funded by the Soros Foundation, produced a report that formulated proposals for the Biden administration on Washington's attitude towards HTS. In particular, it stressed the need for the United States to work with its European allies and Turkey to “ push the HTS to take further action to address key local and international issues and set clear targets that, if met, could enable the HTS to decommission himself labeled "terrorist"," the document noted.

US and Ukraine bring in new jihadist fighters to fight Russia
In this regard, a "road map" was proposed, which contained proposals on what needs to be done by HTS so that NATO countries eventually stop treating it as a terrorist organization. In the future, it was supposed to support similar changes in the status of HTS in the UN, where "terrorist marks" should also be removed from it.

As a result, according to the idea of the Americans, HTS should acquire a legal status and it is with her that negotiations should be conducted on the future of the Syrian region of Idlib.

Western countries are now ready to increase stabilization support for "critical services" in Idlib, provided that HTS expands the space for Western NGOs to work, supports the activities of civil society organizations and "shows a clear commitment to political and religious pluralism."

In turn, recent events related to the restoration of Syria's membership in the Arab League and Ankara's readiness to normalize relations with Damascus may force Washington to intensify efforts to legalize HTS. The United States continues to oppose Syria's exit from the regime of international isolation and, perhaps, will seek to more actively support any opponents of Bashar al-Assad , who were previously refused assistance.

The most powerful and organized anti-government group in the SAR is the HTS. By taking the group under guardianship, the United States can prevent the solution of the Idlib problem through a Syrian-Turkish compromise. Such a compromise implies the establishment of control over the region by the Syrian government with certain concessions to the opposition.

Washington can also use HTS to put pressure on Turkey.
Recently, there has been growing tension for control over resources between pro-Turkish groups from the Syrian National Army and the HTS. This group seeks to become the only significant opposition force that has closed on itself all external support for the remaining afloat Syrian rebels, whom it would like to attach to its own forces along with the territories under their control.

In addition, the HTS-controlled region of Idlib is already being used to recruit foreign fighters to take part in the fighting in Ukraine on the side of the Kyiv regime. In particular, militants from the Ajnad al-Kavkaz group, which consists mainly of Chechens, have already arrived in Ukraine from Idlib, and so-called. "Albanian group".

Also, through their outreach activities, resources affiliated with HTS , including numerous Telegram channels, began to openly support the United States and Western countries, as well as Ukraine in conflict with Russia. A few years ago, direct support of these states by such jihadist structures seemed unthinkable.

ISIS terrorists are also in the focus of US attention

In addition to the HTS, the United States will continue to use fighters from another terrorist organization, ISIS (or IS ), to destabilize Syria.

In January 2022, there was a mass escape of ISIS militants from the Al-Hasakah prison in northeastern Syria, held by the US military and the Kurdish left-wing radical SDF. Among the fugitives were, among other things, high-ranking commanders of the group. Thanks to this, it was possible to significantly increase the combat capability of this terrorist organization. Especially given the fact that many of the fugitives made it to ISIS bases in central Syria.

However, even after this escape, the flow of both recruits and veterans of ISIS, smuggled out of Kurdish prisons under American control in northeast Syria, continued.

It is significant that these prisons contain both experienced militants, as well as young people and children. They at least continue to receive the appropriate ideological pumping from the "senior comrades"; they are taught both the skills of warfare and the conduct of terrorist attacks.

The increased activity of ISIS in Syria in recent months has led to heavy fighting this spring, in April and May, in the area of the Syrian city of Al-Qaum. Then the ISIS militants were able to take control of several settlements, and government forces only with the support of Russian PMCs and aviation managed to squeeze them back into the desert.

The growth of this terrorist activity is due to the fact that from the camps and prisons in the territory held by the Americans and Kurdish militants, groups of ISIS terrorists are purposefully “dumped” from time to time, which penetrate into the territories controlled by the government. These "emissions", of course, are controlled by the US military and the SDF, which open the appropriate corridors for this.

Such actions of the Americans have three goals.

First, to reduce tension in the camps themselves through the release of the most trained and active militants from there.

Secondly, through the activation of ISIS militants in the Syrian desert, open a second front against Russia, which will force it to divert its capabilities to the Syrian theater of operations. However, as the battles for Al-Qaum showed, government forces without Russian support are still ineffective in conducting counter-terrorism operations.

Second after Afghanistan. In Syria, a fatal blow is dealt to US hegemony
Thirdly, the activity of ISIS will serve as an excuse not only to maintain, but also to increase the American military presence in the Syrian northeast. Its declared goal is to prevent the revival of ISIS. Therefore, as long as ISIS is active, supporters of continued American intervention in Syria will always have an appropriate argument for Congress.

At the same time, the Americans will support the persistence of this threat of a “rebirth of ISIS” through the use of their own channels for replenishing terrorist cells exclusively in the desert areas controlled by the Syrian government. At the same time, these “dumpings” of ISIS militants from prisons and camps will be dosed and will allow maintaining the level of escalation that the Americans need, and if necessary, the flow of militants can be blocked.

Link

The Grand Turk

US, Turkey sanction four people who allegedly provided funds to Islamic State

2023-01-06

[IsraelTimes] Announcement signals counterterrorism cooperation between the two countries amid tensions over Erdogan’s threat to launch an offensive against the Syrian Kurds

The US said Thursday it has worked with ~~The Sick Man of Europe~~ Turkey
<del>The Sick Man of Europe</del> Turkey

<del>The Sick Man of Europe</del> Turkey

...the only place on the face of the earth that misses the Ottoman Empire...
to impose sanctions on four people and two firms that it says provided financial support to the Islamic State
...formerly ISIS or ISIL, depending on your preference. Before that they were al-Qaeda in Iraq, as shaped by Abu Musab Zarqawi. They're really very devout, committing every atrocity they can find in the Koran and inventing a few more. They fling Allah around with every other sentence, but to hear western pols talk they're not really Moslems....
group.

The announcement signaled counterterrorism cooperation between the two countries at a time of tensions over efforts to fight Islamic State.

~~Ottoman~~ Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan has threatened an offensive into Syria against Kurdish ~~bandidos~~ turbans he has blamed for a deadly November 13 bombing in Istanbul, which has alarmed US officials. Kurdish groups have been allied with the US in the fight against Islamic State group and have warned that a ~~Ottoman~~ Turkish escalation would threaten anti-IS efforts.

In its announcement Thursday, Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control said it was imposing sanctions on an Iraqi national living in Turkey, Abd Al Hamid Salim Ibrahim Ismail Brukan al-Khatuni, his sons and the ~~Ottoman~~ Turkish money service firm where they all worked. They are accused of facilitating financial transfers to and from Iraq and Syria for the benefit of the Islamic State.

Another individual, Lu’ay Jasim Hammadi al-Juburi, an Islamic State financial administration official also living in Turkey, was accused of using the firm Sham Express, a company founded in 2020 by Brukan al-Khatuni, to transfer funds to the Islamic State.

Thursday’s sanctions freeze and block any potential transactions with US entities and prevent Americans from doing business with them.

The State Department noted that Turkey is concurrently freezing the assets of those targeted by the US sanctions.

Brian Nelson, the Treasury’s Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence said Thursday’s actions reaffirm "Treasury’s commitment to degrade ISIS’s ability to operate globally."

The actions come after two November rounds of sanctions were imposed on people and firms in Africa who it says have provided financial or material support to Islamic State.

The Islamic State group is also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS.

In November, Defense Department officials warned that they were "deeply concerned" about escalating IS activities in Iraq, Syria and Turkey. "This escalation threatens the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS’s years-long progress to degrade and defeat ISIS," said Pentagon Press Secretary Brig Gen Patrick Ryder.

Courtesy of badanov:

The #US Treasury Department says it is taking joint action with #Turkey against a network it says played a key role in money management, transfer and distribution for the #ISIS group operating in #Iraq and #Syria.https://t.co/cVuVBO3OeI
— Al Arabiya English (@AlArabiya_Eng) January 6, 2023

They included an Iraqi national living illegally in Turkey, Brukan al-Khatuni, his two sons and an associate, and two businesses they used to transfer money on behalf of the ISIS, also known as ISIS, between Turkey, Iraq and Syria, the Treasury Department said in a statement.

The head of the network targeted on Thursday, Brukan al-Khatuni, helped with foreign financing for the group in Iraq before moving to Turkey in 2016, where he helped transfer funds from Gulf-based donors and handled millions of dollars for the group, according to the Treasury Department.

Link

Afghanistan

Islamic Clerics’ Gathering Issues 11-Point Resolution, Hekmatyar kibbitzes in the background

2022-07-03

[ToloNews] The participants of the holy mans' gathering held at the Kabul Loya Jirga Hall released a resolution comprised of 11 principles, in which they called on the world to lift sanctions on Afghanistan and to recognize the Islamic Emirate.

The resolution did not directly mention the reopening of girls’ schools, but a part of it called for the Islamic Emirate to attend to modern and religious education for men and women.

Resolutions from holy mans' gathering at Loya Jirga Hall:

Participants pledged allegiance to the Islamic Emirate leader.

The international community is called on to release Afghan assets.

The participants called the current government 'legitimate" and called for its recognition.

Support announced for decree of Islamic Emirate on drugs.

Support given for the Islamic Emirate policy to not interfere with other countries and to expect the same from other countries.

Any type of cooperation with ISIS is forbidden.

Armed opposition against the current government is rebellion.

Islamic Emirate called on to attend to religious and modern education, health, agriculture, rights of ethnic minorities and women and kiddies and economic development, within the structure of Sharia.

Islamic holy mans who cause provocations via media must stop.

Islamic Emirate called on to incentivize national unity.

Clerics support the Islamic Emirate’s efforts to facilitate the return of Afghan figures from abroad.

Talking to participants of the holy mans' gathering, the Prime Minister Mullah Mohammad Hassan Akhund said that the people of Afghanistan want Hijab and an Islamic government and there are less people who oppose it.

Hekmatyar Asks Why Women Not Included in Gathering

[ToloNews] Following reactions over women's absence in the "Gathering of Islamic Clerics",

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
... who used to be known in intelligence circles as The Most Evil Man in the World but who now seems merely run-of-the-mill evil...
, the leader of Hizb-e-Islami, questioned the reasons for the exclusion of women from the meeting, stating the Islamic Emirate should provide a clear response to the people and the world.

According to Hekmatyar, women's rights are clearly recognized in Islam.

Dawn adds more about the rebellion point:

Nearly 3,000 Afghan religious scholars, at the conclusion of a three-day meeting on Saturday in the capital Kabul, declared the militant Islamic State group and others' armed resistance against the Taliban government as "rebellion" and said the country was duty-bound to repel such elements.

A joint declaration issued after the conclusion of the grand moot said: “We call on the nation that the so-called Isis (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria) is a 'Kharijite'

...an insult that dates back to the Third Caliph, and one the Talibs are particularly fond of...

group of this age that spreads corruption in our Islamic country. Any help or association with them is illegal."

The IS and the National Resistance Front

...NRF for short. They’re the reincarnation of the primarily Tajik Northern Alliance that drove back the Taliban a generation ago...

of Afghanistan are fighting the Afghan Taliban. Another little-known group was involved in a failed attempt on Thursday that targeted the participants of the scholars' meeting but all three suspects were killed by the Taliban special forces.

The participants, as per the declaration, also declared allegiance to Taliban supreme leader Sheikh Hibatullah Akhundzada.

“We renew our allegiance to the Leader of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, Sheikh Al-Hadith Hibatullah Akhundzada and strongly support him. We have accepted him as the Sharia ruler of Afghanistan and the emir of the Islamic emirate. And from Allah in all religious and worldly matters we wish you success,” the declaration said.

Akhundzada arrived in Kabul this week for the first time since the Taliban took over control of the country in August last year. He also made his first public appearance since then and delivered a speech on Friday in which he rejected foreign pressure on his government.

Link

Home Front: WoT

ISIS chief from Brooklyn who groomed terrorists and made prisoners dig their graves before shooting them faces life in jail after being found guilty of conspiracy to provide material support to a terror group

2022-05-26

[Daily Mail, where America gets its news]

Formerly a legal permanent resident in Brooklyn, Mirsad Kandic, 40, was found guilty on Wednesday by a federal jury on a six-count indictment, including two counts resulting in death

He was arrested with false papers in Sarajevo in 2017
... specifically a fake Ukrainian passport
Charges include one count of conspiracy to provide material support to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), and five counts of support to ISIS
...he was a major recruiter and propagandist for ISIS, among other responsibilities
The three-week trial included testimony of 36 witnesses and evidence spanning six continents

Kandic began to express a desire to travel to Pakistan, Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Middle East to fight U.S. forces in martyrdom missions in 2005

At sentencing, he faces life imprisonment on the two counts resulting in death, and 20 years' imprisonment on each of the other four charges

TIMELINE OF A TERRORIST: HOW ISIS CHIEF LEFT THE US BEFORE GROOMING FIGHTERS AND SOURCING DEADLY WEAPONS

Kandic tried to leave the US attempted to fight jihad as early as the summer of 2012

But the terrorist was denied boarding at the US point of departure and told he was on the no-fly list

In January 2013, Kandic attempted to fly from Toronto, Canada, to Istanbul, Turkey, on a direct flight. He was again denied boarding

The defendant then took a two-day Greyhound bus ride from New York City to Monterrey, Mexico, in November 2013, and flew through Panama, Brazil, Portugal, Germany, Kosovo, and Turkey before arriving in Syria at the end of 2013

In Syria, Kandic joined ISIS and became a fighter for the group in Haritan, an ISIS stronghold in the outskirts of Aleppo, wielding Russian-made PK machine guns and AK-47 assault rifles

Link

Afghanistan

9 killed, 13 Wounded in Two Blasts in Balkh

2022-04-29

[ToloNews] At least nine people were killed and 13 others were maimed in two blasts occurring on Thursday evening in Mazar-e-Sharif of Balkh province, security officials said.

Both blasts targeted public transportation.

A front man for the Balk security department said that the blasts were due to explosives placed in vehicles.

Provincial health officials confirmed hospitals had received bodies of the slain and were treating the maimed.

Khaama Press adds:

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Daesh has claimed accountability for two bomb blasts in Mazar-e-Sharif city of the northern Balkh province that killed at least nine and injured 13 more civilians.

The terror group has claimed 30 people to be affected after the explosions.

The Two explosions took place only minutes before people break their fast and at a time when commuters were rushing home to do so.

Asif Waziri, spokesperson of the city’s police said the target is apparently Shiite people.

based on the information of Waziri, one IED hit a van while the second one exploded in a van station in Police District three of the city.

This comes only a week after ISIS targeted a mosque named Sih Dokan in the northern Afghan city killing and injuring tens of Shiite worshipers.

Link

Iraq

How jihadist groups choose to fight conventionally-Report

2022-03-26

How jihadist groups choose to fight conventionally-Reporthttps://t.co/bunZRkqLeE
— SHAFAQ News (@Shafaqnews) March 25, 2022

On August 16, 2021, the world watched in awe as the Taliban marched into Kabul unopposed and nonchalantly shot photos in the Afghan presidential palace. The group’s rapid seizure of territory and capture of Kabul so stunned the world that the United States failed to evacuate thousands of its Afghan allies in time (though it did get some 120,000 people out before leaving). But the Taliban’s lightning advance should not have been a surprise. Despite an entrenched tendency to conceptualize jihadist groups as intrinsically irregular combatants—born out of two decades of US military experience during the post-9/11 wars—several such organizations have demonstrated a capability to effectively adopt conventional warfighting methods.

The Islamic State (IS) group achieved similar feats in its military campaigns several years earlier, marking a decades-long culmination of jihadist conventionalization, or adaptation of jihadist fighting styles to conventional warfare. The jihadist ideology has always sought the establishment and preservation of a caliphate by force, necessitating the development of robust conventional warfare capabilities to seize and defend territory. The case of IS reveals the most important characteristics of this jihadist way of war and how to fight against it. It also illuminates major lessons about the future jihadist threat and how the United States can more effectively work with its allies to meet it.

The IS way of war developed out of an ideological divergence between IS and its former parent organization, al-Qaeda. Having witnessed the swift demise of Afghanistan’s Taliban regime following the 2001 US-led invasion, al-Qaeda head Osama bin Laden urged his followers to refrain from openly holding territory and confronting larger, more advanced forces like the US military until their adversaries were sufficiently weakened and the jihadists gained enough public support.

Nonetheless, the foundational jihadist principle of tamkin (a degree of empowerment that, in this context, enables consolidation of land to govern) proved stronger in the minds of al-Qaeda affiliates than their leader’s advice and it would remain the norm for jihadist groups to attempt to hold territory through campaigns of conventional warfare. Such was the case with al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in Iraq, Mali, Somalia, and Yemen. IS, developing out of al-Qaeda’s Iraqi affiliate, ventured further than any other jihadist group, taking on an apocalyptic outlook and labeling al-Qaeda and its supporters apostates for delaying the return of the caliphate. Indeed, IS saw the caliphate as not only its vision of a just society based on sharia (Islamic law), but also the base of the supposed forces of good against the antichrist in an imminent apocalypse.

With this sense of urgency, IS went about devising a strategy for seizing the considerable territories it would need to build its caliphate. The group’s early-2013 entrance into the ongoing Syrian civil war marked its definitive shift toward conventional warfare, and patterns in its operational style began to emerge. Four variables informed the IS way of war: organizational innovation, shaping operations, will to fight, and retention of the initiative.

The 2012–14 period featured extensive reorganization and expansion of the IS military (the group was known at this time first as the Islamic State of Iraq and later as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). Most significant were the group’s creation of battalions, each with 300–350 fighters, all governed by a formalized bureaucracy called the Department of Soldiers and an improved military industry apparatus under its Committee for Military Manufacturing and Development. This augmented organization enabled the group to grow exponentially, absorbing more than forty thousand foreign fighters from over 110 countries and bringing its total numbers of fighters and their dependents possibly into the hundreds of thousands. The new arrivals often came with technical education and military experience that helped further boost IS military capabilities. At the same time, the group’s expanded military industrial capacity allowed it to build small arms, mortars, rockets, and—most importantly—suicide bombs on a large scale with a high degree of standardization.

High explosives production and other innovations fueled IS’s most important battle tactic: the frequent use of suicide car bombs (SVBIEDs, or suicide vehicle-borne improvised explosive device), often so heavily up-armored that they were nearly impervious to small arms fire and RPGs. The group used these SVBIEDs as shock weapons followed by a light infantry assaults. On the offensive, IS deployed SVBIEDs much like a regular army might use artillery or airstrikes—to soften up and demoralize targets in preparation for or close support of a ground assault. Exemplary of this tactic were IS attacks on Menagh Air Base (August 2013), Tabqa Airbase (August 2014), and the Ramadi city center (May 2015). On the defensive, IS frequently used SVBIEDs and follow-on light infantry advances in brutal tactical and operational counterattacks, particularly in eastern Mosul (October–December 2016) and, as I recount in my book, throughout the Hajin pocket along the Euphrates River in northeastern Syria (November 2018–March 2019).

Key to IS military success was the group’s ability to weaken targets before engaging them in combat. As Craig Whiteside has shown, a flexible tribal engagement strategy, hostile to some Arab tribes and conciliatory with more amenable ones, facilitated IS gains particularly in Iraq’s Anbar province by winning a degree of acquiescence and support from tribes that could have blocked the group. One example is the mid-2014 IS alliance with the Albu Karbuli and al-Salmani tribes against the more hostile Albu Mahal in al-Qaim in exchange for plunder and governance responsibilities. In contrast, as at Haditha, tribes and local populations that remained staunchly opposed to the organization largely held out against IS attacks, though jihadist assassination campaigns against hostile tribes, such as the Albu Nimr, at times helped tip the balance in IS’s favor. Infiltration of enemy security forces and insertion of sleeper cells were additional effective shaping tactics that helped cause Iraqi units to collapse during the IS assault on Mosul in June 2014 and a year earlier at the IS-orchestrated Abu Ghraib prison break. In defensive operations, IS shaping capabilities were much diminished over time, especially when it could no longer plan to attack targets far in advance and had to invest resources in preparing to meet adversary offensives. This helps explain why IS was far less successful in defending its territory than it was in seizing it.

The most essential and consistent characteristic of the IS way of war was the high will to fight of its fighters along with a preference for engaging significantly demoralized foes. Shaping operations, coupled with information warfare and high IS determination, aimed to maximize the morale differential between IS and its adversaries so that when combat ensued, the latter would already be so brittle that victory would come quickly. American veterans of battles against IS remarked to me that IS fighters showed consistently high levels of determination and rarely fled or surrendered in disarray. Azad Cudi, a member of the US-backed People’s Protection Units (YPG), even recalls an instance of foolhardy jihadist determination at the battle of Kobane (September 2014–March 2015), with fighters reinforcing a position no less than four times despite airstrikes vaporizing it each time. IS won major, quick gains when it achieved a wide morale differential and suffered when it could not. Indeed, with some exceptions (like the sixteen-month IS offensive on Ramadi), the group’s most significant victories were won in a matter of days or weeks; getting bogged down against a determined foe or in a defensive posture forced IS to rely more heavily on the inconsistent tactical combat proficiency of its fighters, which reduced their success even though these fighters would mostly stand their ground and fight to the death unless they decided to retreat.

With organized, highly determined fighters and weakened adversaries, taking the initiative and keeping enemy forces on their toes was essential. Accordingly, IS fighters generally fought aggressively, with high mobility and frequent fighting patrols. This aggressive style kept IS adversaries constantly guessing, often paralyzing them, as at Ramadi in early 2015. Michael Knights and Alexander Mello aptly characterized the IS operational style as “tactical restlessness,” an “almost pathological need to take the initiative and attack the enemy. This approach can and does help sustain morale and extend the operational experience of surviving troops, but it also tires troops and continually erodes overall force strength.”

The resulting self-attrition of the IS operational style is further reason for IS to prefer fast-paced operations, and its persistence even on the defensive ultimately contributed to the group’s inability to win virtually any defensive battles, when its enemies held the initiative. Moreover, an intensifying air campaign from late 2014 onward considerably reduced the organization’s mobility and exacerbated the self-attritional effects of its aggressive approach, notably at Kobane.

While IS remains in an insurgent posture, we should not forget that its ultimate goal, like that of all jihadists, is to control and govern territory. If given the opportunity, IS is likely to pursue conventionalization again. The organization’s entrenchment in Iraq and Syria in 2013–19 necessitated intensive military efforts to dislodge the jihadists from their territories and led to the deaths of tens of thousands as well as widespread displacement and devastation.

Although IS is now deprived of its territories in Iraq and Syria, its style of conventional warfare was on display with the Taliban’s recent recapture of Afghanistan. The rapid weeklong offensive culminating in the fall of Kabul followed months of surrenders to the Taliban, negotiations with tribes to acquiesce to the group’s rule, and buyoffs of police and militias as US forces departed. These efforts were strikingly similar to the IS tribal engagement campaign in Iraq. Where the Afghan army had a presence, the Taliban infiltrated its ranks, assassinated important military figures, and threatened soldiers’ families to instigate desertions, just as IS had done to Iraqi security forces. Demoralized by the American withdrawal and without hope for reinforcement, any remaining army units collapsed quickly and the Taliban entered Kabul without any fighting, reminiscent of the fall of Mosul to IS in less than a week.

Hence, the Taliban’s aggressive retention of the initiative in a fast-paced, merely weeklong nationwide offensive after such a sweeping shaping campaign resembled—likely inadvertently—the IS style of territorial acquisition, indicating the emergence of an increasingly effective jihadist way of war.

In its former territories, IS has reverted to an insurgent posture, but is re-conventionalization possible? On the organizational front, the group’s ranks in Iraq and Syria are decimated, down to only ten thousand according to the latest US Department of Defense estimates.

At the same time, the group has maintained a steady pace of attacks since 2019, including complex high-casualty strikes such as a bombing in Baghdad in July 2021 and regular deadly ambushes in Syria’s Badia desert region on forces loyal to embattled dictator Bashar al-Assad. If Assad regime forces are unable to retain control over the Badia, that region could become a flashpoint for IS recruitment and territorial rebuilding, with IS already performing shaping operations there like extortion and intimidation of locals and tribal communities. Despite considerable Russian and Iranian military support and access to armor and airpower, the regime has recently made virtually no progress against any major rebel faction, raising questions over its forces’ morale and continued willingness to fight. With morale and some shaping activities in its favor, IS might use a small territorial enclave (in the event of a reduced regime presence) in the Badia as a base for organizational rebuilding and future conventionalization.

Moreover, IS might attempt larger operations at al-Hawl refugee camp or prisons holding IS fighters in northeast Syria under the control of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The camp holds some 59,000 people, including an estimated 8,555 individuals linked to IS per camp administration statistics, while SDF detention centers hold thousands of IS members. The camp’s horrendous conditions, as well as IS efforts to enforce its extreme interpretation of sharia in the camps, like punitive killings, leave camp residents more vulnerable to radicalization and cooptation by IS.

A significant escape from al-Hawl or the prisons would help replenish the group’s ranks and reenergize its conventionalization. However, the SDF—with vital US support—has managed to keep IS activity down, and attacks in SDF territories are considerably less lethal than those in regime-held ones. Also, a large SDF counterterrorism operation in al-Hawl in March greatly reduced killings in the camp. An exceptionally large IS assault on al-Sinaa Prison in January 2022 in SDF-controlled Hasakah that led to seven days of heavy fighting is a stark reminder of the enduring threat the jihadist group poses, but the coalition and SDF response rendered the assault a failure, indicative of the robust cooperation between the two and the SDF’s strong development.

Hence, the SDF is a major obstacle for IS activities in al-Hawl and prisons, but the potentially grave consequences of a successful IS breakout operation still make them a point of concern for IS re-conventionalizing.

Finally, IS could find resources for a resurgence outside Iraq and Syria. In 2014, when IS was still accumulating territory, it sent many of its fighters to help establish territories in Libya, which they did successfully. Today, the group’s West Africa Province still controls territory in Nigeria and carries out major military operations against the Nigerian army and the forces of neighboring countries.

During the past two years in Mozambique, IS-affiliated fighters seized and then lost the towns of Mocimboa da Praia and Palma. IS-linked jihadists in the Democratic Republic of the Congo staged a complex breakout of 1,300 inmates. Of particular concern is the activity of IS-Khorasan Province (IS-K), the IS affiliate in Afghanistan. One of IS’s more lethal and tactically proficient provinces, IS-K was formed largely by defectors from the Taliban and other jihadist groups and seized territory from the Taliban in 2014–15 before being repulsed by the Taliban and US-backed Afghan security forces.

IS-K has benefitted from the US withdrawal, perpetrating dozens of attacks since August 2021, and now wages a fierce insurgency against the Taliban. The growth of IS-K or other provinces could give IS the opportunity to once again transfer experienced fighters to places where it seeks to conventionalize.

This analysis has identified three flashpoints for a potential IS resurgence: Assad regime territories in the Badia; al-Hawl and prisons under SDF control; and the growth of IS provinces outside of Iraq and Syria, IS-K in particular. Just as US support has been crucial for defeating the caliphate, so too will it remain paramount for continuing effective counter-IS operations in Iraq and Syria.

In areas where the United States has lesser or no presence, such as West Africa, Afghanistan, and Assad regime territory, it might exert some pressure through limited airstrikes when needed, but it can also foster its partners’ capabilities so that when the next jihadist conventional campaign begins, we will be prepared to meet it—as we were not in Afghanistan.

Link

Iraq

Iraq issues a sentence of death against Al-Qaeda members

2022-03-01

Iraq issues a sentence of death against Al-Qaeda membershttps://t.co/I5WX4IgeHg
— SHAFAQ News (@Shafaqnews) February 28, 2022

Shafaq News/ On Monday, a Criminal Court issued a death sentence against two terrorists from Baghdad.

A security source told Shafaq News Agency, "The Criminal Court in Dhi Qar Governorate issued a sentence of death by hanging against two al-Qaeda members who were in prison for eight years for killing citizens in the Latifiya area in Baghdad."

It is worth noting that the Latifia- Mahmoudia-Yusufia area is known as the "Triangle of Death," where groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda were active and carried out massacres against citizens and security forces after 2004.

Al Qaeda in Iraq, or the Islamic State of Iraq as the group is also known, is one of several Sunni Islamist insurgent groups that had been very active just after the withdrawal of the US troops.

The group has claimed a string of attacks.

According to Reuters, the group was founded in October 2004 when Jordanian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden. An Egyptian, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, has become the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq after Zarqawi was killed in 2006.

In October 2006, the al-Qaeda-led Mujahideen Shura Council said it had set up the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), an umbrella group of Sunni militant affiliates and tribal leaders led by Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. Reuters reported.

Link

Africa Subsaharan

ISIS Expanding In Nigeria, Other Africa Countries Despite Leader’s Death

2022-02-11

ISIS Expanding In Nigeria, Other Africa Countries Despite Leader’s Death, United Nations Warns | Sahara Reporters https://t.co/Cbve17h8bo pic.twitter.com/zxlLtKA1lU
— Sahara Reporters (@SaharaReporters) February 10, 2022

The United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism says the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL or ISIS), a terrorist group, is expanding its affiliates and network beyond Syria and Iraq to Africa.

The Under-Secretary-General of the UN office of counter-terrorism, Vladimir Voronkov told the Security Council on Wednesday that the epicentre of ISIL terrorist group – officially known as Da’esh – activities now appeared to be in the African continent.

The under-secretary-general said that the terrorist activities were gaining ground in the Central and West Africa, which he said continues at an “unsettling” scale and pace.

According to him, the terrorist activities intensifying in Central and West Africa – especially Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Mali and Niger and attacks increasingly reported in the border area between Mozambique and Tanzania.

Pointing to potential spill-over effects that could reach even beyond the continent, he urged countries to use every tool at their disposal to sustain important gains made against the group.

He added that a subsequent targeted attack reportedly resulted in the death of the ISIL/Da’esh leader, Amir Muhammad Sa’id Abdal-Rahman al-Salbi, widely known as Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraishi.

While that victory marks perhaps the most significant recent blow to the group’s leadership in years, the UN counter-terrorism warned that ISIL/Da’esh is known for its ability to re-group and even intensify its activities.

"We have learned over the past two decades that counter-terrorism is a long-term game and that there are no quick fixes," he stressed.

Citing the need for both military counter-terrorism operations and more comprehensive measures with a focus on prevention, he urged states to use all tools at their disposal, adding, "As we begin a new decade of counter-terrorism, it is time to ask ourselves difficult questions and search for honest answers."

Link

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